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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The concept and the substance of social rights as rights of citizenship are of contested and relatively recent 
historical provenance. Prior to the emergence of modern welfare states, social provision across Europe was 
based largely in localised systems of discretionary poor relief shaped in part by religious influences. The rise of 
industrial capitalism gave rise to social concerns that found expression in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries in a tenuous but essentially social liberal consensus favouring the development of a 
disparate array of social insurance arrangements for the protection of workers. The subsequent evolution of 
such arrangements was affected in a variety of ways by the consequences of two world wars and the rise and 
fall of communism. In the mid-twentieth century, at the time that the foundations of the EU were being laid, 
social rights emerged as implicit or explicit components of national citizenship in a variety of Western 
European welfare regimes, but also as aspirational principles established through an international human 
rights framework. Towards the end of the twentieth century, the combined effects of financial globalisation, 
the collapse of communism in Eastern and Central Europe and the hegemonic rise of neo-liberal economic and 
managerial orthodoxies have given rise in the twenty-first century to less certain understandings of social 
rights. Such evidence as we have indicates there is no unanimity among policy actors as to the meaning of 
social rights and that the discourse and understanding of social rights is as variable within European countries 
as it is between them. The development of social policy is not grounded in a shared understanding of social 
rights. The barrier to the defence and promotion of social citizenship in Europe lays not so much in 
inconsistencies in the de facto realisation of specific rights as in a failure explicitly to engage with and 
accommodate uncertainties and/or ideological differences as to the aim and purpose of such rights. If there is 
to be a broadly consensual and effective form of supra-national European social citizenship, this may require 
serious debate as to the basis for some kind of substantively shared social policy initiative (such as the 
introduction of a modest European Citizen’s income). 
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1. INTRODUCTION: SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPE 
This report is concerned with the past and future development of social rights in Europe and the competing 
influences that have shaped and currently inform that development. The approach is essentially sociological. It 
is concerned not directly with legal formulations, economic theory or the political foundations of citizenship, 
but with underlying social discourses and understandings. Social rights are considered as ideological, moral 
and therefore essentially social constructs.  
LEVELS OF CONSTRUCTION 
It may be argued that social rights are best understood as ‘articulations of human need’ (Dean 2010; 2015). 
They are constructed through the process by which human beings socially negotiate the naming and claiming 
of needs and the legitimacy of the demands that human beings place upon each other. The earliest human 
societies, as associations of interdependent beings, will have established customary rules for ensuring 
everyday wellbeing (e.g. Sahlins, 1974). In their struggle for survival and fulfilment human beings have come in 
various ways to articulate the ethical premises by which to recognise the needs and claims of not only 
intimates and neighbours, but of distant strangers (Honneth, 1995). In this sense, the construction of social 
rights preceded the emergence of cities or nation states and the development of formal law and political 
process. Social rights, as creatures of struggle and custom were and are fundamentally constitutive of our 
humanity. More recently and conventionally, however, we have constructed social rights at two levels: either 
as components of welfare state citizenship (Marshall, 1950) or as specialised elements of the international 
human rights framework (e.g. Donnelly, 2003; Freeman, 2002). 
At the citizenship level, social rights are widely regarded as a ‘Western’ twentieth century invention, ushered 
in by advanced industrial capitalism and the creation of the modern welfare state. The ancient origins of 
citizenship as the exclusive status of a patrician male elite gave way, following the so called European 
Enlightenment, to new modes of governance commensurate with the development of capitalism (Turner, 
1986), and eventually to mechanisms by which, in highly complex affluent societies, it was potentially possible 
for the needs of all citizens to be met through mechanisms of collective distribution (Titmuss, 1970). 
Citizenship could be understood not only as a status, but as a practice: a practice with uneven and frequently 
suboptimal outcomes, not least because citizenship status  evolved in ways that continued to  marginalise, if 
not exclude, on the basis of class, gender, ethnicity and disability. (Lister, 2003). But social rights had been 
evolving long before they were identified and named as social rights and the social rights to which modern 
European welfare states supposedly gave birth had been preceded for centuries by a variety of customary, 
charitable and administrative practices, the nature of which inevitably influenced modern forms of social 
citizenship and shaped the emergence of social rights as creatures of policy and law: specifically rights to work, 
social security, health and social care, education and housing. 
At the human rights level, a new generation of ‘economic, social and cultural rights’ (an expression for which 
the term ‘social rights’ is widely regarded as a synonymous contraction) was formally announced by the UN’s 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (the UDHR). The declaration gave expression in the wake of 
two world wars to a loose international consensus (Davy, 2013), driven in particular by a social liberal ideal 
summed up in a demand - variously espoused, for example, by Roosevelt (1941) and Beveridge (1942) - for 
individual freedom from ‘Want’. The UN eventually in 1966 established separate International Covenants to 
give effect to the Universal Declaration: one for Civil and Political Rights, the other for Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. The latter allowed for the ‘progressive realisation’ of social rights as creatures of principle and 
doctrine, requiring state parties in the first instance to respect such rights; second to protect such rights; and 
third, so far as resources permitted, to fulfil such rights (for discussion, see Shue, 1980). In the meantime the 
Council of Europe had in 1950 established the European Convention on Human Rights (the ECHR, primarily a 
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civil and political rights treaty) and in 1961 the European Social Charter (the ESC, a social rights treaty). The ESC 
was revised in 1996. 
At the level of the European Union (EU) as a supra-national body, the pertinence of social rights has been 
somewhat ambiguous. The EU began life in 1957 as an economic union (the European Economic Community), 
concerned fundamentally with market promotion rather than social protection (e.g. Scharpf 2002; Hantrais, 
2007). It has since been evolving as an incipient political union as much as an economic union and in recent 
decades has to sought to extend cooperation between member states into l’espace social (Delors, 1986), 
explicitly laying claim to a ‘social dimension’ (CEC, 1993). The EU promulgated a Charter of Fundamental Social 
Rights in 1989. Extended versions of this were incorporated as Social Protocols to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty 
(in which some reference to ‘European Citizenship’ first appeared), the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, and finally 
into the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, which additionally included a 'horizontal social clause' that requires the EU 
when defining and implementing its policies and activities, to 'take into account requirements linked to the 
promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social 
exclusion, and a high level of education, training and protection of human health.' (Clause 9). Pessimists had 
previously contended that the EU social policy was no more than ‘an empty shell’ (Faulkner, 2000). Optimists 
suggest that the Lisbon Treaty potentially signified a mainstreaming of social policy issues (e.g. Vielle, 2010). 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Social Rights incorporates elements of the ESC, but the rights it enshrines are 
arguably more symbolic than real. Over the years EU directives have clearly had practical consequences for 
social protection policies across Europe, but EU influence over the rights of European citizens could, as Barbier 
puts it, ‘be indirectly observed, because of the growing power of EU economic law (the freedom of 
movement)’ (2013: 100). The impact of the EU on the status and recognition of social rights is uncertain. The 
concept of ‘Social Europe’ has been at best under-realised and according, for example, to Bailey (2008) will 
continue to face obstacles at the level of social, political and institutional relations. 
CITIZENSHIP MODELS AND WELFARE REGIMES 
Amongst these obstacles are the divergences evident between member states and the path dependencies 
evident within them. This report will explore the extent of such obstacles, having particular regard to differing 
social constructions of social rights. Welfare regime theory (Esping-Andersen, 1990; and see Ferragina & 
Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011) provides a framework with which to model the different ways in which social rights may 
be socially constructed. Elements of such an approach have been applied elsewhere to reflect on the 
implications of, on the one hand, competing interpretations of citizenship and, on the other, different 
approaches to equality and social order (Dean, 2012: 20-24). A version of the heuristic taxonomy to which this 
gives rise is presented visually in Figure 1 below and elaborated in the ensuing explanation. The taxonomy 
revolves around the contradictory European Enlightenment demands immortalised in the French 
Revolutionary slogan: liberté, egalité, fraternité, or freedom, equality, solidarity. On the one hand, the 
demands for freedom and solidarity are not necessarily commensurable. On the other, the demand for 
equality is capable of competing interpretations and potentially conflicts with the requirements of social order. 
As a result one may conceptualise four models of social citizenship, each of which is consistent with a different 
kind of welfare regime and, potentially, a different idea of social rights. 
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• Freedom with procedural equality fits with Esping-Andersen’s classic definition of a liberal welfare 
regime. The immanent function of social rights is to facilitate opportunity and the effective but principled 
functioning of capitalism. Such rights articulate the individual needs of utility maximising market actors. 
• Solidarity with substantive equality fits with Esping-Andersen’s classic definition of a social democratic 
welfare regime. The immanent function of social rights is to accommodate capitalism to principles of 
social justice. Such rights articulate the shared needs of socially engaged citizens. 
• Freedom within an authoritarian social order fits not with any of Esping-Andersen’s classically defined 
welfare regimes, but with the traditions of the Poor Law regimes that preceded but continue to influence 
modern welfare regimes. Insofar as such traditions give expression to social rights, they are conditional 
and function practically to underwrite the survival of the fittest in a competitive social and economic 
environment. Such rights articulate the basic needs of morally deserving individual survivors. 
equality 
freedom solidarity 
social order 
procedural substantive 
authoritarian paternalistic 
Figure 1: Citizenship models and welfare regimes 
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• Solidarity within a paternalistic social order fits with Esping-Andersen’s classic definition of a socially 
conservative, Christian democratic or corporatist welfare regime. The immanent function of social rights 
is to accommodate capitalism to established social practices, conventions and structures. Such rights 
articulate the shared needs of socially incorporated subjects. 
 
It must be emphasised that actually existing welfare regimes are inevitably hybrid and usually complex in 
character; and that the labels that we may for convenience attach to evolving ideologies can as easily obscure 
as illuminate what they may once have defined. What is more, recent trends in welfare governance, increased 
pluralism in social provision and the consequences of new public managerialsm provide a changing backdrop 
(e.g. Newman, 2005). The typology outlined above is no more than a conceptual framework or tool that will be 
applied later in the course of this report when considering evidence in relation to historical evolution and 
current discourses. 
THE TASK AND ITS PARAMETERS 
The study or task on which this paper reports incorporated participants from eight European countries: 
Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the UK. The task was conducted in two 
parts. The first entailed the production of country accounts examining the history and current development of 
social rights in each country. The second entailed key-informant interviews with a small selection of policy 
actors from each country. Each component of the task will be reported upon separately in the pages that 
follow.  
The empirical focus of the task was restricted in two ways. First, though the creation of social rights is 
embedded in legal and political processes (which are the concern of other Tasks within the Work Package of 
which this limited study was a part) we were attempting to capture something about the ideas and 
constitutive discourses through which social rights find expression across Europe. It was not feasible given the 
limited resources and skill-sets available to the partners who participated in this research to have generated a 
consistently detailed account of the faltering development of social citizenship in eight separate countries, or a 
wholly exhaustive picture of the complex array of social meanings currently attaching to social rights in 
Europe. The study should be considered as a pilot project or scoping exercise. 
Secondly, there was a selective focus on just four categories of social right: the right to social assistance, to 
housing, to healthcare and to education. It is necessary to preface the accounts and the analysis that follows 
with a brief discussion of the how these categories are to be defined and the ways in which they may intersect 
and relate to one another: 
 
• Social Assistance. The term is used to refer to forms of means-tested safety-net provision. Social 
assistance has its origins in the era of the Poor Laws when it would have been available not as a right but 
on a discretionary basis. Modern welfare regimes have generally legislated to provide rights to some form 
of social assistance, but subject to varying degrees of conditionality and, in some instances, 
administrative discretion. Such provision may be connected to the provision of assistance in kind and to 
other forms of social support for low-income or vulnerable households. Generally, however, social 
assistance takes the form of tax financed cash benefits that are wholly distinct from contributory social 
insurance benefits.  
• Housing. Social rights to housing may be realised in three quite different ways: first, through social 
assistance in the form of means-tested allowances or housing benefit for low-income households or the 
provision in kind of temporary shelter for vulnerable homeless households; second, through state 
regulation of private provision, including rent controls, laws on security of tenure or controls over 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
housing conditions; third, through the provision of dwellings, by way of subsidies to housing providers 
and/or direct public sector provision. 
• Healthcare. Social rights to healthcare may be realised through the provision of a de-commodified public 
service or through public subsidy and regulation of private or charitable sector providers. Rights can be 
based on social assistance principles (for uninsured or destitute persons), social insurance principles, or 
universal principles (where treatment is tax financed and provided free of charge). 
• Education. Social rights to education may be realised through the provision of a de-commodified public 
service or through public subsidy and regulation of private or charitable sector providers. Insofar as 
education is compulsory in all established welfare regimes, the rights of parents and children to choose 
the form and content of provision may be contested. In the European context, it is significant that the 
Council of Europe incorporated a provision that ‘no person shall be denied the right to education’, in the 
ECHR (First Protocol, Article 2), rather than in the ESC: the right is framed in terms of freedom of access, 
rather than as a substantive social right. 
 
These are the broad parameters within which the study was undertaken, but it is important to emphasise that 
‘social rights’ is a protean term that defies precise definition and the primary object of the task was to explore 
similarities and differences in the ways that social rights are formulated and understood and the extent to 
which it is possible in a pan-European context for the term to have a degree of common and coherent meaning 
for the citizens of Europe.  
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2. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: SOCIAL RIGHTS AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCTS 
 
Individual country accounts, some of which are in the public domain, were prepared as follows:  
• for Sweden, by Otto Swedrup, University of Gothenburg 
• for Denmark, by Silvia Adamo, University of Copenhagen 
• for the Netherlands, by Susanne Heeger and Frans Pennings, University of Utrecht 
• for Germany, by Florian Blank, Institute of Economic and Social Research (WSI) 
• for the UK, by Hartley Dean, London School of Economics and Political Science  
• for Spain, by Sergio González Begega, University of Oviedo  
• for Poland, by Andrzeji Marian Świątkowski and Marcin Wujczyk, Jagiellonian University  
• for Estonia, Gaabriel Tavits, University of Tartu 
 
Partners to the exercise were asked to prepare: 
• A succinct narrative account of the overall development of social rights in their own country. The account 
should attempt so far as possible to identify any distinctive phases of development and the logic 
informing each such phase. 
• A succinct discussion of current social policy trends in their own country, focusing on the latest overall 
trajectories of change that bear upon the scope and definition of citizens’ social rights. 
• A set of specific illustrative discussions relating to each of the four policy areas which we had been tasked 
to investigate; namely, social assistance, housing, health provision and education.   
 
The authors of the resulting accounts, as scholars from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds, struggled 
valiantly to comply, generating a fascinating collection of materials. In doing so, they themselves 
demonstrated the fundamental difficulty of grasping the contestable nature of social rights as a social 
construct and, for example, the elusive boundaries between social and legal constructions and between rights 
and policies. Certain gaps inevitably remain.  As an experiment, however, it was more than worthwhile. The 
task of synthesising an overview from such diversely framed contributions has been challenging. To do so, we 
have necessarily been selective in some instances; we have brought interpretations of our own to bear; and 
we have drawn on occasions  on supplementary sources. 
Of the countries included in the exercise: 
• Two, Sweden and Denmark, are classically regarded as Nordic or Social Democratic welfare regimes with, 
according to Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser (2011), high de-commodification scores (39.1 and 38.1 
respectively). 
• Two, the Netherlands and Germany, though different in important respects, are Western continental 
European countries and each were founder members of the European Economic Community in 1957. The 
Netherlands, has been characterised as a ‘corporatist’ or  
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Figure 2: welfare state development time-lines 
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 conservative/social democratic hybrid welfare regime, with a medium-high de-commodification score 
(32.4). Germany is classically regarded as a conservative welfare regime, with a medium de-
commodification score (27.7). 
• The UK is classically regarded as a liberal welfare regime, with a low de-commodification score (23.4).  
• Spain is regarded as a distinctively ‘Southern’ or ‘Mediterranean’ welfare regime (e.g.  Ferrera (2006); 
Bonoli, 1997), though its foundations were strongly conservative/corporatist. 
• Two, Poland and Estonia, are both post-communist welfare regimes, albeit that the former is inclined to 
conservative traditions and the latter to a liberal approach (Cerami & Vanhuysse, 2009).1  
 
Welfare regime theory, while capturing patterns relating to factors such as de-commodification and the extent 
of substantive social protection and provision, does not directly address itself to social rights. Labour power 
and/or essential human services can be more or less highly commodified, but the significance in terms of 
‘rights’ to protection and/or to access services will vary depending on just how the citizen or subject is 
conceptualised or constituted. Unpicking every dimension and nuance from conventionally descriptive 
historical accounts is a difficult task. For the purposes of the exercise, we focus on a time-frame from the later 
parts of the nineteenth century to the early part of the twenty-first century. This is the period in which modern 
welfare states developed. It was a period punctuated by two world wars; by the rise and fall of communism; 
and by global financial crises. We have attempted to interpret the narrative accounts provided in relation to 
historical phases, social policy developments and constitutional milestones. Visual summary representations of 
the time-line for each country are provided in Figure 2 above, and brief summaries of the individual country 
accounts are provided below. 
NORDIC COUNTRIES: SWEDEN AND DENMARK 
Sweden and Denmark share certain historical characteristics. On the one hand, both were Protestant countries 
(specifically Lutheran), while on the other, the modernisation of agriculture in each proceeded relatively 
gradually and in a manner that fostered relative equality and solidarity between social classes: a combination 
of factors that leant itself to a particular understanding of the relationship between individuality and collective 
state organisation.  Kananen (2014) suggests that the evolution of the Nordic welfare states is best 
characterised in relation to three eras: prior to World War II, a ‘Modernisation’ era of emancipatory social 
development, in which the early development of education characteristically played a key part; between WWII 
and the 1970s, a ‘Welfare State’ era, in which strongly collectivist structures were consolidated and extensive 
rights to social security and social services were developed; and since the 1970s a ‘Renegotiation’ era in which 
collectivist structures have been reformulated in an attempt to accommodate to new global economic 
orthodoxies. This broadly fits the accounts with which we have been provided (Swedrup, 2015; Adamo, 2015). 
By the nineteenth century, parish-based Poor Law provision in both countries still bore the stamp of traditional 
Lutheran austerity, though they began to be brought under closer administrative control. In Denmark this was 
facilitated by liberal principles established in the 1849 Constitution (by which Denmark became a 
constitutional rather than an absolute monarchy). In Sweden it occurred a little later in the century with the 
establishment of municipalities and County Councils (the latter, for example, assuming incipient responsibility 
for public health provision). The nineteenth century had also witnessed the beginning of state intervention in 
basic education with the establishment of Folk Schools, (from 1814 in Denmark and 1842 in Sweden). Towards 
the end of the nineteenth century and during the beginning of the twentieth, Sweden witnessed an expansion 
of state responsibility for housing and working conditions, and for sickness benefits; Denmark, witnessed the 
development of old age pensions, mandatory health and accident insurance, followed by voluntary 
1 Directly comparable commodification scores for Spain, Poland and Estonia not available. 
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unemployment and disability insurance, underpinned by tax-financed public assistance. By the 1930s, Sweden 
was developing increasingly inclusive or universalistic system of social insurance. The Social Democratic Prime 
Minister, Per Albin Hansson, famously declared that the aspiration of the Swedish state was to become ‘the 
people’s home’. Denmark similarly experienced what Adamo characterises as its ‘breakthrough years’ creating 
an extensive national insurance system whose aim was to underwrite ‘the good society based on ideas of 
citizenship – not nationality ... but community’ (2015: 10). 
In the post WWII era both countries strengthened and consolidated their social policies, establishing a model 
that closely conformed to Marshall’s ideal of a ‘democratic-welfare-capitalist’ society (1981). Sweden 
introduced child benefit, institutionalised housing and employment programmes and earnings-related social 
security; it expanded public services and reorganised education. Denmark embarked on what Adamo describes 
as the ‘Glory Times of the welfare state’ (2015: 11), with the institution of a universal health service, a range of 
family policies and the reform of social assistance. The Danish Constitution of 1953 provided not necessarily 
rights, but guarantees to its citizens of work, social assistance and education.  
Sweden and Denmark were by no means immune to the world-wide crisis of the capitalist welfare state that 
occurred in the 1970s (Mishra, 1984), which precipitated change in both countries. In Sweden, however, the 
effects were not manifest until the 1980s and despite the crisis, the Swedish Constitution (or ‘Instrument of 
Government’) of 1974 - which replaced a long-since obsolete document of 1809 - made explicit provision for 
social rights, in the following terms: 
Public power shall be exercised with respect for the equal worth of all and the liberty and dignity of the 
private person. The personal, economic and cultural welfare of the private person shall be fundamental 
aims of public activity. In particular, it shall be incumbent upon the public institutions to secure the 
right to health, employment, housing and education, and to promote social care and social security. 
[Article 2] 
The drafting owes something to the UDHR (and/or the ECHR and ESC), but it may be noted that whereas the 
aim is to secure the right to health, employment, housing and education, the Article seeks only to promote 
social care and social security. The Article was amended in 2009 to read as follows: 
Public power shall be exercised with respect for the equal worth of all and the liberty and dignity of the 
individual. The personal, economic and cultural welfare of the individual shall be fundamental aims of 
public activity. In particular, the public institutions shall secure the right to employment, housing and 
education, and shall promote social care and social security, as well as favourable conditions for good 
health. 
The changes are ostensibly subtle, but arguably significant. The ‘private person’ has been recast as ‘the 
individual’, which suggests that Sweden may have resiled from the idea of a ‘people’ whose members have 
both a private and a shared public persona, in favour of a more conventionally liberal conception of the 
individual and the state. And the right to health has been replaced by a commitment to promote ‘favourable 
conditions for good health’, which suggests some preference for the idea that personal health and healthcare 
provision are not necessarily a direct state responsibility. Might these amendments be emblematic of a shift in 
thinking about social rights in the period between 1974 and 2009? In Sweden there have been observable 
trends towards liberalisation or marketisation; processes which from a Nordic perspective are seen as 
coterminous with ‘Europeanisation’ (Swedrup, 2015) and which have included the adoption of supply-side 
oriented approaches to labour market activation and increased participation of both private providers and civil 
society actors. The Swedish welfare state has been relatively resilient despite liberal reforms and greater fiscal 
austerity, but for example: though Sweden has an extensive public housing sector resulting from past 
development, current housing policy is confined to the provision of housing benefits; though there is an 
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extensive tax-funded health service, modest co-payments are required of patients and there is increasing 
private sector involvement; though there is an extensive tax-funded education system, independent ‘free’ 
schools have been introduced. 
Denmark, between the 1970s and the 1990s experienced growing political scepticism regarding the 
affordability and efficiency of its welfare state and a movement towards what might be defined as ‘market 
socialism’ including the introduction of the principles of New Public Managerialism, and of elements of 
conditionality, particularly in the field of labour market activation or ‘flexicurity’ policy. Adamo (2015) suggests 
that since the turn of the twenty-first century a ‘liberal wind’ has been especially evident, with the increased 
intrusion of private actors into public affairs; a growing tendency for the citizen to be recast as ‘customer’ or 
consumer of public services; and an emphasis not so much on social service provision, as upon a selective of 
social investment approach. But as in Sweden, the welfare state is an enduring feature of the Danish polity and 
remains strong. 
FOUNDER EEC MEMBER COUNTRIES: NETHERLANDS AND GERMANY 
As nation states The Netherlands and Germany emerged from a complex and fluid patchwork of states, 
territories and peoples in Western Europe and accordingly share not only geographical proximity but a long 
and tortuous history. Both might now be regarded as exemplars of the Rhineland model of consensual 
capitalism. Most significant for the purposes of understanding the construction of social rights and approaches 
to social citizenship is that both countries have had to accommodate both Catholic and Protestant religious 
traditions, as well as entrenched class-based ideological divisions and influences. 
The Netherlands became a constitutional monarchy by virtue of its constitution of 1848, which provided the 
basis upon which subsequent reforms to the Poor Laws ensued. The reforms replaced indiscriminate 
discretionary provision by religious and private charity with parsimonious state provision governed by the 
principles of subsidiarity and inevitability, so preserving a role for charity and restricting the role of state to 
minimalist social assistance. The constitution also (since 1917) permitted parents freedom to choose between 
state and denominational education for their children.  The German Empire was established through the 
federation of 27 states (both Protestant and Catholic) by a constitution in 1871. The constitution, for the time 
being, left intact the various Poor Law arrangements and incipient schooling arrangements of the constituent 
states.  
Both countries would go on to develop social insurance arrangements. In the case of the Netherlands this was 
a gradual process that did not begin until just after the turn of the twentieth century, when the government 
finally followed the example set by Germany under Bismarck (see below) by instituting compulsory industrial 
accident insurance, though it took a further 30 years by stages to introduce insurance for sickness, invalidity 
and old age (Heeger & Pennings, 2015). In the meantime, provision for discretionary poor relief was 
maintained and developed through the municipalities, which also had responsibility for the funding and 
supervision of social housing. The delay in copying Bismarckian-style social insurance was occasioned in part 
because of deep disagreements over the ‘social question’ between conservatives, (including farmers and self-
employed artisans), liberals and industrial workers, and partly because of ‘pillarisation’: the principle at that 
time that social organisations, including schools and social insurance schemes,  should be instituted within 
three co-existing sovereign spheres or ‘pillars’: the Protestant (primarily Calvinist); the Catholic; and the 
secular, though the secular pillar eventually separated into liberal (pro-business) socialist (working class) 
pillars. The resulting complexity and the compromises required limited the pace of progress until after WWII. 
The German story was different. The German Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, drove through the introduction 
of the first social insurance schemes in the 1880s, responding to what he regarded not as the ‘social question’, 
but the ‘worker question’ (Blank, 2015). Bismarck sought to forestall the revolutionary potential of an 
emerging socialist/labour movement through the introduction of mandatory and strategically segmented 
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social insurance schemes. It has been argued that Bismarckian social insurance had its roots primarily in a 
Protestant-based social conservatism (Kaufmann 1988): Bismarck, a staunch Protestant, was able to speak to 
the priorities of the Catholic social movement, which sought to abate the disharmony between labour and 
capital: therein lay the pragmatic foundations of Christian Democracy, which would eventually shape modern 
Germany’s welfare state.  However, the First World War intervened, at the end of which, the Weimar 
Constitution explicitly laid the foundations of a liberal democratic social state (Sozialstaat). The constitution 
proposed comprehensive health insurance, education to age 18, opportunity for all to work, provision for 
necessary maintenance for those who could not. (It even included a distinctly Social Democratic provision that 
the government should endeavour to secure international regulation of the legal status of workers to the end 
that the entire working class of the world may enjoy a universal minimum of social rights [Article 162]). In the 
1930s, despite adverse economic conditions, the three established branches of social insurance (health, work 
accident, old age & invalidity) were strengthened, a fourth (unemployment) was added and, for example, 
provision was made for housing and rent controls. Under the Third Reich, however, the constitution was 
subject to revision and reinterpretation. Though social provision did not cease, it was premised not on rights, 
but the tyranny of National Socialism and scientific racism, an ideology and a cause that precipitated WWII. 
The end of that war portended the development of modern welfare states, underpinned by Keynesian 
economic principles, in both The Netherlands and West Germany. For the Netherlands this entailed the 
restoration of government and a period of incremental but substantial growth in social provision. The 
Netherlands had been subject to Nazi occupation during WWII and its government exiled to London. The 
reforms instituted after the war, while they were implemented in the context of The Netherlands’ corporatist 
traditions, were in part inspired by the example of the 1944 Beveridge Report in the UK. But, for example, the 
mandatory health insurance scheme imposed on the population during the German occupation was adopted 
and adapted. A new national benefits administration was created, replacing the fragmented assortment of 
pre-war workers’ unemployment, sickness and disability insurance schemes, while new universal (or 
residence-based) schemes for old age pensions, healthcare and housing benefits were introduced and 
significant reforms to social assistance were made. By the 1970s social public expenditure levels in The 
Netherlands were on a par with those in Sweden. Goodin et al. (1999) would argue that despite its corporatist 
style of governance, The Netherlands might be regarded as a Social Democratic rather than a 
Conservative/corporatist welfare regime. 
For the new Federal Republic of Germany the post WWII period entailed rebuilding and restructuring. In the 
first instance, this meant reclaiming structures established under the Weimar Republic. But the new 
constitution, or Basic Law, of 1949 laid down principles to be realised through specific legislation and codes, 
including a Social Code that cautiously provides for social rights (Soziale Rechte) in pursuance of the state’s 
protective obligations (Blank, 2015: 3). In the years that followed, provision was made for pension reform; for 
adjustment and consolidation of social insurance schemes, with an explicit emphasis on maintenance of living 
standards; extended health insurance; a clear right to social assistance; subsidies for house building and 
provision for housing benefits; and the development of vocational education. 
When The Netherlands and Germany joined the EEC in 1957 they could be regarded as having set themselves 
on broadly similar trajectories in terms of both economic and social policy and when later, in the 1970s, they 
were beset by pressures from the global financial crisis, economic globalisation and demographic transition, 
their responses were broadly but not entirely similar. The Netherlands initially struggled to sustain the costs of 
social security provision, but combatted what had been characterised as the ‘Dutch Disease’ by negotiating 
some restructuring of state welfare and some adaptations to labour market practices. The so called ‘Dutch 
Miracle’ that followed resulted primarily from a one-off surge in labour market participation. Insofar as these 
steps entailed some curtailment of social rights, they coincided - paradoxically perhaps - with the adoption in 
1983 of a revised constitution, which makes express provision for social rights, including rights relating to 
employment, education and health, though these are framed largely in the generalised language of the UDHR 
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and/or the ECHR/ESC. From the 1990s onwards, however, there has been a significant trend to neo-liberal 
managerialisation in Dutch social policy with the adoption of rigorous ‘work first’ labour market activation 
policies; increased conditionality and the promotion of a ‘rights and responsibilities’ discourse; and the 
introduction of mandatory private insurance for basic healthcare. 
Germany too responded initially with some cuts to social provision, though its problems were compounded by 
the consequences of the re-unification in 1990 of West Germany (The Federal Republic) and East Germany 
(The German Democratic Republic, that had since WWII been part of the ‘Eastern Bloc’ within the sphere of 
influence of the Soviet Union). The strength of the German economy allowed the welfare state to remained 
relatively resilient, and even to introduce a fifth branch of social insurance (to cover social care costs), but 
there has nevertheless been an ineluctable trend to liberalisation: re-commodification through supply-side 
labour policies (the Hartz reforms of 2002-3); introduction of co-payments and privatisation within healthcare; 
privatisation and de-regulation of housing. The emphasis has been on a ‘social investment’ approach, means-
testing and on individual ‘choice’ in relation to the use of public services (Blank, 2015). 
The Rhineland model of consensual capitalism may endure, but it has imported certain neo-liberal 
orthodoxies. 
 THE UK: AN ANGLOPHONE COUNTRY 
The UK is generally held up as an example of a liberal welfare regime, but as with all such classifications, this is 
an oversimplification. First, most commentators agree that immediately after WWII the UK might have been 
regarded as an emerging Social Democratic welfare regime. Second, the UK is increasingly less than a United 
Kingdom, since the devolution of policy making powers from Westminster to Scotland and, to a lesser extent, 
Wales and Northern Ireland, makes the discussion of social rights in the UK potentially complicated. Inevitably, 
therefore, the thumb-nail sketch that follows is a highly reductive account and one that may in practice be 
disproportionately (and unfairly) focused on England. Nevertheless what characterises the UK is that it has 
historically been a predominantly Protestant country; it has been a major imperial power and remains very 
much part of an Anglophone world with horizons beyond Europe; it was the first country to industrialise and 
did so at a pace and in a context that fuelled significant class-based divisions, albeit without formal brokerage 
through permanent corporatist institutions; it has no written constitution. 
The English Poor Laws had a history dating back to the sixteenth century and beyond, but their administration 
was subject to systemic reform in 1834, whereby the relief of poverty was based on institutional deterrence 
and the Victorian workhouse. In the course of the nineteenth century the Poor Law was by stages relaxed so as 
to permit - often in concert with organised charity - minimal ‘out relief’ to those deemed deserving and some 
measure of care for the sick and frail (de Schweinitz, 1961). Elementary state education was introduced in 
1870. The turn of the twentieth century witnessed the emergence of a new social liberalism and in the years 
before WWI the foundations of a welfare state were laid through the introduction of a non-contributory old 
age pension, followed by limited unemployment and health insurance schemes. There were also 
developments in state education and public health, though the focus was on the pursuit of National Efficiency 
rather than any notion of social rights. The inter-war years saw regulation of private rented housing and 
significant investment in social housing; piecemeal extensions to social insurance, but the retention of means-
tested unemployment assistance and poor relief. 
During WWII, Sir William Beveridge (a Keynesian economist and a senior Liberal) was commissioned to 
produce a report (1942) which outlined the basis on which a post-war welfare state would be built. The 
Beveridge Plan envisioned a comprehensive national insurance system, but with universal family allowances 
and a national assistance safety net. The Plan was premised on the assumption that, in addition to such 
measures, the country would develop a tax-funded National Health Service, maintain a universal education 
system and adopt a vigorous programme of social housing provision. The Plan was interpreted and 
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implemented by a Labour (at that time essentially Social Democratic) government after 1945 and was rolled 
out, developed and adapted under different governments during the 1950s and ’60s. By the ’70s the welfare 
state was under pressure - as much because of systemic failings as because of external pressures (e.g. Fraser, 
2003). It was becoming increasingly reliant on means-tested social assistance provision as social insurance and 
universal benefits were failing to prevent poverty. Further reforms became necessary in order to provide for 
social groups whose needs had not been fully foreseen in the Beveridge Plan: disabled people, low-paid 
workers, lone parent households, homeless families. It was during this period that the UK joined the EU, on the 
assumption that, by helping to strengthen its national economy, the country would be better placed to meet 
the challenges it faced. 
The election in 1979 of a ‘New Right’/monetarist Conservative government portended a period of major 
reform: public spending restraint; extensive privatisation of social housing and deregulation of private rented 
housing; increased levels of conditionality in social assistance provision; vigorous promotion of private 
pensions; the initial introduction of new managerial and market mechanisms into healthcare and education 
(Glennerster & Hills, 1998). Such trends were continued following the election in 1997 of a ‘Third Way’ Labour 
government, which while attempting to moderate inequality, placed ever greater focus on supply-side labour 
market and welfare-to-work policies and on the promotion of competition in the provision of public services 
(Hills et al., 2009). 
Following the onset in 2008 of the global financial crisis, the election in 2010 of a Conservative/Liberal coalition 
government heralded significant public spending cuts and an era of unprecedented fiscal austerity (that 
continues unabated under a neo-liberally inspired Conservative majority government following the 2015 
General Election). Changes since 2010 have entailed an attempted rationalisation of means-tested 
support/social assistance with the imposition of overall benefit caps and draconian labour market 
activation/workfare policies; and the opening of healthcare and education to further competition and private 
sector involvement. The present government has committed itself to re-negotiating the terms of the UK’s 
membership of the EU and thereafter holding a referendum as to whether membership should continue; and 
additionally withdrawing from the ECHR, while introducing a ‘British Bill of Rights’ (which, almost certainly, 
would not incorporate social rights). 
SPAIN: A SOUTHERN EUROPEAN COUNTRY 
Spain is an example of a Mediterranean or ‘Latin Rim’ European nation. It had in past times been a major 
imperial power, but it was slower than the Northern European countries to industrialise. It is a country with a 
turbulent history that has been dominated by a powerful conservative Catholic tradition.  
Until the late nineteen century the Catholic Church enjoyed a virtual monopoly over social policy; specifically, 
education and the governance of poor relief. However, in the period after the Spanish monarchy had been 
restored (following the short-lived First Spanish Republic of 1873-1874), the debate of the ‘social question’ 
that was occurring elsewhere in Europe did receive attention. And, just as the principles of social insurance 
had attracted some degree of consensus between opposing social interests elsewhere in Europe so, it would 
seem, it was possible for emerging Social Catholic doctrines, expressed in the Rerum Novarum Papal encyclical 
of 1891, to accommodate the demands of the Krausist movement espoused during the 1880s by Spanish 
liberal intellectuals (González Begega, 2014). The result was the gradual unfolding of social insurance schemes 
relevant initially only to relatively small numbers of industrial workers. Over a 20 year period, however, 
industrial accident insurance, a voluntary health insurance and a compulsory old age insurance were achieved, 
the development of which continued under the benign dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera. 
The Second Spanish Republic established in 1931 promulgated a constitution that boldly proposed a right to 
minimum welfare, a unified system of social insurance and a universal right to education, free of Catholic 
influence. A Republican/Socialist government developed plans for a national system of social insurance and set 
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about the development of a state education system. These initiatives were respectively blocked and reversed 
by a conservative coalition government between 1933 and 1935. A leftist Popular Front elected in 1936 sought 
to recover the initiatives but implementation was overtaken by the Civil War through which General Franco 
would establish a Fascist dictatorship that would endure from 1939 until 1975. During the initial years of the 
Franco regime social policy arrangements were prescribed according to ‘fundamental laws’ laid down in a 
Labour Charter and resulted in segmented compulsory social insurance programmes, including health 
insurance, modelled to an extent on those of the German Nazi regime, but which covered only a small 
proportion of the population. The Regime also introduced a form of family subsidy or allowance for workers.  
Education was regarded as an instrument to strengthen national Catholicism and modest educational reforms 
sustained this principle. In the 1960s and early ’70s, as the Spanish economy strengthened, social protection 
policies were extended: a unified National Social Security System was created; unemployment insurance for 
workers and a non-contributory pension for people over the age of 70 were introduced; housing policies were 
expanded; education was restructured and made free and compulsory, while permitting state subsidies to 
Catholic and other non-state schools. 
 The death of Franco in 1975 opened the door to a democratic era, including in 1978, a new constitution which 
incorporated an express guarantee of ‘adequate social assistance’ and rights to ‘adequate housing’, ‘health 
protection’ and ‘education’. The period that followed witnessed trends to social democracy, decentralised 
provision, but with a fluctuating role for tripartite/corporatist social dialogue. Universal healthcare and 
education systems were developed in the 1980s. Social insurance based social security systems were 
consolidated and supplemented with certain non-contributory benefits. In 1986 Spain acceded to the EEC/EU, 
the impact of which was manifested in social policy trends from the 1990s onwards, a period that witnessed 
pressure for restraint in social spending; the ‘rationalisation’ of public services and a quest for greater 
efficiency; elements of privatisation in health provision; and adaptations to accommodate labour market 
flexibility and the introduction of labour market activation policies. These trends towards neo-liberal and 
managerial principles are associated by some commentators with the consequences of European accession 
(González Begega, 2014). A period of socialist coalition government from 2005-2011 led to some attempts to 
‘recalibrate’ the Spanish welfare state and this did result, for example, in the introduction of a system for long-
term social care provision. Nevertheless, since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, Spain has been 
subject to economic crisis, close fiscal policy supervision and a financial sector bailout by the EU, and 
associated retrenchment/austerity policies that constrain the realisation of social rights. 
 POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES: POLAND AND ESTONIA 
Poland and Estonia have a shared legacy as EU members that had previously been under Soviet bloc 
communist control. But they have deeper historical links, since a portion of Estonia was once part of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, before it was partitioned between Prussia, Austria and Russia in 1795. The 
small Congress Kingdom of Poland, which briefly enjoyed a semi-autonomous status within what was then the 
Russian Empire, had enacted its own Poor Law in 1817, while further legislation in 1842 provided for social 
assistance through municipalities with support from charity.  (Świątkowski & Wujczyk, 2014). There is 
evidence, relating to poor relief systems then pertaining in Estonia, to be found in a report relating to the 
Russian Empire submitted by The Hon. J.D. Bligh and published in Appendix F  to the Report to the British 
Parliament by HM Commission on the Poor Laws in 1834, that: 
In Courland, Esthonia and Livonia, the parish (or community) are bound to provide for the destitute to 
the utmost of their means, which means are to be derived from the common funds; from bequests, or 
from any charitable or poor fund which may exist; and in Esthonia, from the reserve magazines of corn, 
which, more regularly than in Russia, are kept full by contributions from every peasant. .... Those who 
will not work voluntarily, may be delivered over to any individual, and compelled to work for their own 
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support, at the discretion of the elder and his assistants. .... Those poor who are found absent from 
home, are placed in the hands of the police, and transferred to their own parishes. 
This suggests the approach to poor relief in Eastern European countries developed along lines that were 
broadly consistent with that across the whole of nineteenth century Europe: where relief was given, it was 
paid out of locally raised funds, dispensed on a largely discretionary basis, subject to compulsion to work and 
the exclusion of strangers. But as elsewhere, certainly in the Polish case, there is evidence of moves towards 
more centralised supervision. 
It was not until after WWI that Poland and Estonia emerged as independent republics, a status that each 
country briefly enjoyed until WWII. In this period both countries began to develop social welfare policies. In 
Poland: the Social Welfare Act of 1923 portended an explicit shift from ‘social help’ to ‘social welfare’ and the 
beginnings of social insurance-based social security provision, including a limited health insurance scheme. 
There was provision for compulsory and free primary education by a decree of 1919 and under the 1921 
constitution, with further reforms to secondary and supplementary vocational educational provision in 1930s. 
Steps were taken for the regulation of landlords and some state investment in low-cost housing. The Estonian 
constitution of 1920, modelled in part on the Germany’s Weimar Constitution (see above), provided that: 
The organisation of the economic life in Estonia must correspond with the principles of justice, the 
object of which is the securing of conditions of living worthy of human beings by corresponding laws 
relating to the acquiring of land for cultivation and a home, and the obtaining of employment, as well as 
the necessary support for the protection of maternity, labour, youth, old age, disability, and in cases of 
accident. [Article 25]  
The constitution made express provision for free and compulsory basic education and subsequent legislation 
providing for substantive systems of social care, health care and social security (Tavits, 2014). 
Estonia was occupied and absorbed into the Soviet Union in 1940 as a Soviet Socialist Republic. Poland was 
subject during WWII to invasion by both Germany and the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of Poland, 
established in 1945, remained effectively under Soviet control. In Poland, the liberal principles of the 1923 
Social Welfare Act were abandoned. Social assistance became a residual/discretionary function of the 
communes. There was direct state management of dwellings through a billet system, but subsequent 
liberalisation and provision for housing co-operatives. Nevertheless, there was an extensive democratisation of 
healthcare, with free state provision. And the 1952 constitution provided for pre-school, primary, and 
secondary and vocational education. The development of social policy in Estonia was directly linked to that of 
the Soviet Union (e.g. George & Manning, 1980) with its own distinctive welfare regime based on guaranteed 
employment, subsidized prices and extensive state-enterprise-based social benefits. The level of wages, 
benefits and pensions were comparatively low and the standard of health and housing provision, for all but the 
Communist Party elite, could be poor. Under Soviet Communism it may be argued that social rights - as 
declared in the UDHR - were realised up to a point, but from a liberal-democratic citizenship perspective they 
were compromised by the absence of complementary civil and political freedoms (Marshall, 1950). 
In any event, a combination of factors led eventually to the collapse of Soviet Communism and in 1990 both 
Poland and Estonia were restored as independent republics, each of which would establish a new constitution, 
containing some (albeit sometimes indirect) provision for social rights. Poland’s Constitution of 1997 provided: 
a right to social security that ostensibly included a right to social assistance; an obligation on public authorities 
to pursue policies conducive to satisfaction of housing needs and to combat homelessness; a right to 
protection of one’s health and equal access to healthcare services; a ‘right’ to free compulsory education to 
age 18 – with choice of schools and equality of access. Estonia’s Constitution of 1991 provided: a right to 
‘adequate’ assistance is case of old age, incapacity for work, loss of provider, or need; no express provision for 
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housing; provision for protection of health; for education to be Compulsory and free from age 7 to 17. In 
practice this has meant that both Poland and Estonia have had, for example, to shift from centrally provided 
and managed health care systems to a decentralised model, funded by social insurance with an emphasis on 
public provision, albeit with an emphasis on consumer rights  (Świątkowski & Wujczyk, 2014) and/or the 
principles of a market environment (Lai et al., 2013). 
There are differences, however, between the trajectories of the two countries. Poland is a much larger country 
than Estonia and has a strong Catholic tradition compared with Estonia’s weaker religious traditions (Catholic 
and Lutheran).  Poland is more closely linked to the German corporatist traditions, which Estonia as one of the 
small Baltic States to be especially influenced by IMF inspired neo-liberal economic orthodoxies (Cerami & 
Vanhuysse, 2009). 
SYNTHESIS 
The picture provided above is based on lowest common denominator summaries of the country case histories 
provided by our participating partners and omits — a variety of detailed explanation of social policy 
development; nuanced discussion of the ideological compromises informing such development and of subtler 
cultural influences (cf. Pfau-Effinger, 2005); insight into the moral and legal foundations of social rights and 
their justiciability; and critical concerns regarding conflicts between the practice of social administration and 
the principles of social justice. What emerges, nevertheless, is a mixture of differences and convergences. The 
historical variations have been driven by major geo-political events, but the emerging welfare regime 
variations since the development of the EU are arguably, and increasingly perhaps, a matter of degree.  
But this doesn’t clearly tell us is with what consistency the cause of social rights has been understood and 
accepted across Europe. If we take the ratification of social rights treaties as an indicator of national 
commitment to social rights, and record whether the eight countries in our study have ratified the Council of 
Europe’s revised 1996 Social Charter, whether specifically they have accepted the collective Complaints 
Procedure provided for within that Charter and whether they are subject to the EU’s Fundamental Social 
Rights Charter incorporated in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty (a protocol to which allows countries to opt out), the 
results are as shown in Figure 3.  By these indicators, it would appear that Sweden and the Netherlands are the 
most committed, the UK and Poland the least committed to the cause of social rights. 
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Figure 3: Indicators of national commitment to social rights 
 
 
History can tell us about the political and legal construction of social rights, but we are left to infer how social 
rights have been commonly regarded and understood; how the individual has been constituted in relation to 
her claims upon society; and how, by implication, the social subject may have been constituted in relation to 
the state. The summaries above tend to confirm four intersecting influences on the social construction of the 
rights-bearing subject. 
First, religion and the framing of the Poor Laws. In all eight countries the emergence of the welfare state was 
preceded by charitable poor relief, administered initially at parish level by the Church. Such administration was 
subject by stages to varying degrees of legal regulation through the Poor Laws. Whereas it was originally 
Catholic Church doctrine that governed the more or less arbitrary collection and distribution of alms, following 
the Reformation ever closer attention was paid to systematic provision and to the distinction between 
supposedly deserving and undeserving supplicants. Famously, Martin Luther urged the prohibition of begging 
and the reform of relief systems (Liber Vagatorum 1528) and from the sixteenth century onwards the trend 
towards stigmatising conditionality in the administration of poor relief could subsequently be observed across 
Europe in Catholic and Protestant countries alike (Foucault, 1965). Nevertheless, the tension between the 
underlying logic of Catholic and Protestant traditions continued to have some influence on the emphasis and 
design of secular Poor Laws until the nineteenth century. As we have noted, Catholic social doctrine would 
evolve in ways that would accommodate the coming of the modern welfare state, but its initial impetus 
favoured conservative principles of charity and noblesse oblige, casting the individual as a supplicant, subject 
to the traditions of the social order and the authority of the Church; in contrast to the idea of the individual as 
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a different kind of supplicant, accountable ultimately it was supposed to God, but who’s maintenance and 
conduct might nevertheless be subject to state regulation (Dean, 1991). 
Second, capitalism and the ‘social question’. It may be seen that across Europe before, or soon after, the turn 
of the twentieth century there was what might be regarded as a strategic social liberal ‘turn’; a wave of 
concern amongst liberal/bourgeois intellectuals about the social consequences and diswelfares of industrial 
capitalist development. It was a concern motivated as much by self-interest as compassion, but an impetus to 
what might be aptly described as a form of ‘reluctant collectivism’ (George & Wilding, 1985). Social liberal 
thinking may be seen to have played a decisive part in the creation before WWII of incipient welfare states in 
all of the eight countries we have studied. In some instances these early developments were interrupted, but 
in every instance they would seem to have provided the foundations on which forms of provision for social 
rights would eventually be founded. What these developments had in common was that they each re-
constituted those who might have been potential supplicants under the Poor Laws as workers within the 
capitalist economy. Social liberalism was not the only ideological influence: social conservative and social 
democratic influences were also at work. But the organising principle around which social liberalism achieved a 
strategic consensus was that of social insurance. The social insurance principle appeals uniquely both to 
individualistic and solidaristic ideals. It entails individual contribution and collective risk sharing. It is 
authoritarian insofar as membership and contributions are compulsory and insurance schemes are rule-bound. 
But it is also emancipating, since it creates indisputable rights for workers to benefits, pensions and/or health 
treatment. It provided a foundation for the modern Keynesian welfare state. 
Third, constitutional citizenship. There is no straightforward connection between the extent to which, or the 
manner in which, provision for social rights in national constitutions is reflected in countries’ commitment 
either to supranational social rights treaties (see Figure 3), or to the precise configuration of national welfare 
states. Nevertheless it is through constitutions that rights of citizenship are explicitly or implicitly defined. In 
four of the eight countries studied (Germany, Spain, Poland and Estonia), constitutions with express provision 
for social rights were adopted, albeit fleetingly, in the period between WWI and WWII; in three (Sweden, 
Denmark and the Netherlands), a clear constitutional commitment appeared only after a welfare state was 
fully established; and the UK has never had a written constitution. The earlier constitutions were all quite 
similar and bore the imprint of the social liberal wave alluded to above. The later constitutions reflected the 
language of the UDHR and/or the ECHR/ESC. The common feature of the thinking that contributed to all these 
documents, and by which the citizen as a bearer of rights was therefore constructed, was an element of liberal 
individualism. The subject of social rights was, in theory and in part, not only a worker (or, less directly, the 
dependant of a worker) but an individual citizen.2 
Fourth, changing economic orthodoxies. The ‘Golden Age’ (Esping-Andersen, 1996) of post-WWII social 
citizenship accommodated a form of social liberal/social conservative/social democratic consensus, a 
phenomenon in which six of the eight countries we have studied were able to participate, while two (Poland 
and Estonia) were at that time subject to state communist control, albeit that this did entail state provision for 
the social protection of workers. The crisis that befell the capitalist welfare states in the 1970s precipitated 
changes that have been variously interpreted as retrenchment, residualisation or recalibration; and the 
subsequent era has been variously described as post-industrial, post-Fordist or post-modern (e.g. Powell & 
Hewitt, 2002). Welfare states remained relatively resilient but have responded - to a greater or lesser extent - 
to changes in prevailing economic orthodoxy; a neoliberal orthodoxy whose influence extends to the economic 
2 While the gendered nature of social insurance-based welfare regimes systemically benefited the male bead-
winner citizen and subordinated the social rights of women, the emergence of independent rights of 
women has since the 1970s been advanced to some extent through EU equal treatment directives. 
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priorities adopted by the EU (Hermann, 2007; Barbier, 2014: 104) and, of course, to the post-communist 
countries that have since 1990 re-entered the capitalist welfare-state fold. None of the capitalist welfare states 
studied have been wholly immune from the trend from Keynesian Welfare State to what Jessop (2002) has 
characterised as  the Schumpeterian Workfare or Competition State and, in particular, the trend to 
liberalisation or re-commodification of public utilities that the EU actively promotes (Leibfried, 2005). As a 
result the subject of social rights may now be socially reconstituted, not as a citizen, but in part as a consumer 
of public services (including healthcare and educational provision), or once again in the case of workers subject 
to ‘workfare’-style labour market activation policies, as a supplicant. 
Politically and legally constituted social rights do not necessarily translate into de facto social rights (cf. Janoski, 
1998), nor are they necessarily truly ‘social’ in the sense that they reflect the essence of substantive social 
relationships (Isin et al., 2008). The key to the social construction of social rights is the manner in which the 
subjects or bearers of those rights are constituted. What our country case histories emphasise or confirm are 
key transitions in common. The end of the Poor Laws across Europe at or around the turn of the twentieth 
century was driven by a social liberal turn, by which certain subjects of social rights who had been socially 
constituted as supplicants were reconstituted as workers facing potentially insurable risks. Over time and by 
different stages welfare state regimes emerged which socially constituted the subjects of social rights - 
sometimes ambiguously - as citizens of equal social status. But since the 1970s, subject to the influence of 
neoliberal economic and managerial orthodoxies, as bearers of social rights, some workers have again been 
constituted in part as supplicants and some citizens have been reconstituted as consumers. The social basis for 
social citizenship in Europe was never uniformly established and, arguably, is now unravelling.  
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3. CONTEMPORARY DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS OF SOCIAL RIGHTS 
The second part of the task on which this paper reports entailed key-informant interviews with a small 
selection of policy actors from each country. Participating partners were asked to conduct or arrange face-to-
face interviews using a standard semi-structured interview schedule (see Appendix A) with between 6 and 10 
key informants, including politicians and senior civil servants or professionals engaged in the planning and 
delivery of relevant services, and particularly those with responsibility  and/or expertise relating to social 
assistance, housing, healthcare or education. Interviewees were to be recruited using opportunity sampling 
techniques. Participating partners were asked, at their discretion, to include key civil society actors (e.g. 
leaders of relevant NGOs) or other experts (including, possibly, leading academics): that is to say actors with 
influence, representing dominant strands of opinion within, or close to, each country's policy making 
establishment.  Details of the final ‘sample’ of 55 actors with whom interviews were conducted are as 
summarised in Figure 4. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: ‘Sample’ composition 
 
 
All interviews were conducted on the basis of informed consent and in confidence. All interviewees were 
offered anonymity. The procedures and safeguards adopted were formally approved in advance by the London 
School of Economics’ Research Ethics Committee. Interviews were audio recorded, anonymised (unless the 
interviewee has waived her/his right to confidentiality), transcribed and translated into English, where 
necessary. The transcripts were analysed at LSE with assistance from NVivo qualitative data analysis software. 
This was a qualitative research study. The respondents who were interviewed did not constitute a 
representative sample in a statistical sense. What we were sampling for the purposes of this study was the 
discourse of eight national social policy communities. We cannot be certain that in the process we captured a 
full range of relevant component discourses and no claims are made as to the generalisability of our findings. 
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What we can offer are unique insights into the dynamics of social policy discourse and debate in various 
national settings across Europe as it bears upon the social construction of social rights. 
UNDERSTANDINGS OF SOCIAL RIGHTS 
As may be seen from Appendix A, the intention of the interviews was to explore the respondents’ 
understandings of social rights - as a concept; as a commitment; their relationship to needs and 
responsibilities; and with regard to the identity of the social rights bearer. We shall consider the respondents’ 
responses to each in turn 
 
1) THE TERM ‘SOCIAL RIGHTS’ 
Respondents were asked what they understood by the term ‘social rights’ and whether the term was 
meaningful and familiar to them. For some respondents the term proved to be unfamiliar, or was vaguely 
understood or even rejected: for example, “Well, I guess it would be...Well let me just start off, I don’t 
really understand anything in the sense there is nothing that just leaps out” [English civil servant]; “I never 
think in the term social rights, I think more in the term basic needs. You need to make sure that people do 
not fall between two stools. I think that is important. Whether that is a right, that again I find such a word? 
... No!” [Dutch politician]. Other respondents embraced the concept in principle, though their perceptions 
were varied and inconsistent. 
One such perception regards social rights as human rights: they are ‘portable’, in that they apply no matter 
where one comes from or lives within the EU. They ensure that one has the freedom to live a life with 
dignity: for example, “And of course these [social rights] are based upon the concept of human rights and 
life with dignity, and when in need society is obliged to assist you…” [Danish civil servant]. This could be 
linked to the idea that social rights guaranteed the ability to participate in society, since access to basic 
provision in the form of social assistance, healthcare, education and housing is essential for such 
participation, though what was meant by participation could vary between, for example, the ability to have 
a family or the ability to own property: social rights, in other words, facilitate other rights. The idea could 
also be linked to notions of fulfilment, wellbeing or security: for example, “I believe that social rights 
are…acquired rights that have much to do with well-being as a whole. With well-being as a person, internal 
well-being, well-being of relationships with the others and the well-being of life in the environment.” 
[Spanish civil servant]; “But really, so to me social rights are a number of security factors, fundamental 
security factors, and I’d like to add a sense of community, relationships and health and also some type of 
existential health...people should have a right to create meaning in life.” [Swedish civil servant]. 
A second perception focused not so much on rights to health care, housing, education and social 
assistance, but on wider labour or cultural rights, with references to access to buildings and work for 
disabled people; labour rights, such as the right to a living wage, good working conditions and the right to 
assembly and strike; and cultural rights—such as affordable access to theatres, museums, and cheap bus 
tickets. For example, “…in general rights that make it easier to be a citizen or for certain categories of 
people to be citizens.” [Danish civil servant]; “Poland, as a member of the European Union, and a founding 
member of the International Labour Organisation, acts as a guardian of fundamental human rights, 
including social rights, labour rights, improving employability, improving efficiency of social security and 
strengthening the social dialogue.” [Polish civil servant] 
A third perception focused on rights to a minimum existence; to food, shelter and clothing, during a period 
of hardship. For example, “providing that basic facility, making sure that someone can bridge that period 
and can buy food and drinks.” [Dutch civil servant];  “right as a human being to be helped, if you are in 
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need…that we as human beings can survive.” [Danish politician]. However, the notion of what is 
constituted by ‘minimum existence’ might extend to abstract notions of human dignity, so resonating with 
the first of the perceptions outlined above. For example, a German think tank director, alluding to the 
German concept of ‘Existenzminimum’ said “Ok, the basic social rights. Here it is about human dignity.”; or 
“In my opinion, social rights are a group of privileges for a person who—for certain, often economic 
reasons—cannot live with dignity.” [Polish politician]. 
A fourth perception immediately identified the term social rights with rights created through social 
insurance and the means by which to manage classic social risks: unemployment, illness and old age. For 
example, “What I mean by social rights? It is a complex of legislation that provides protection to those who 
need it. This protection is in regard to certain risks that may occur; risks that are difficult to insure privately 
due to which the central government has a duty to take care of that. All social security laws that we have in 
the Netherlands are a result of that.” [Dutch civil servant]. 
A fifth and final perception identified by our analysis, and one commonly expressed by respondents, 
regarded social rights as products of law or convention. Social rights are straightforwardly the creation of 
constitutions and/or legal frameworks: they are what are sometimes described as ‘black-letter’ rights. For 
example “When an entitlement to a basic social minimum is in the constitution, then the state must 
guarantee that. And the state has done that through enacting the social code book. That means that when 
constitutional rights have been established then the state must enforce that.” [German academic/ 
government adviser]; “So that’s how I think of social rights, as something specified in the constitution.” 
[Spanish politician]. Some respondents were clear, however, as to the limits to which constitutions can 
create social rights: “No, the right to benefit, as expressed in the Constitution, is a duty of the government 
and not an absolute right of the citizen. So that means that government may impose obligations towards 
citizens in regard to it. It is not that the public has an unconditional right.” [Dutch civil servant]. And others 
looked not to their own constitution, but for example to the ESC: “This [the European Social Charter] is the 
important document and from that document Estonia has begun its obligation to guarantee the social 
rights.”  [Estonian politician]. It was not so much law that defined social rights as the established 
conventions and customs by which individuals live in a given country. Here social rights are perceived as 
integral to one’s status as a citizen. It is only natural that resources are shared among citizens through 
guaranteed social rights. Whether these rights extend far enough is another issue, but at the core, they are 
assumed as a natural consequence of living in a developed nation. For example, “But I do believe that 
Spanish society has a very entrenched idea that everyone should enjoy the same resources and that they 
are entitled to do so.” [Spanish civil servant]. 
 
2) RESPECTING, PROMOTING AND FULFILLING SOCIAL RIGHTS 
Respondents’ were asked the extent to which—if at all—they thought their country’s government 
respected, promoted and/or fulfilled rights in relation to social assistance, housing, healthcare and 
education. What emerged were not so much reflections on the principle of progressive realisation, as 
expressions of a widely held sense that social rights across these four areas are not one and the same.  The 
‘bedrock’ welfare state services, healthcare and education (Dean, 2015), enjoy greater legitimacy as social 
rights than social assistance or housing. Healthcare was the most likely to be regarded unequivocally as a 
universal right; housing the least likely. 
When asked, most respondents viewed healthcare as a social right. The idea that a country would not 
ensure a right to care seemed unimaginable to respondents across all eight countries. For example, “It’s 
not easy to say which right is above another. But it’s a reality that health and education in Spain have had a 
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much stronger development both legally and regulatory than other areas or other rights which the 
population has access or should have access, such as social assistance, social services, or housing. I believe 
that it is precisely because of what emanates from the feeling of citizenship. The right to health is not only 
laid down in the Constitution but is also one of the basic human rights, that every person by the fact of 
being a person has the right to be treated so that your health is always attended, which does not always 
occur.” [Spanish civil servant]. But when pressed as to whether they thought their government respected, 
promoted and fulfilled the right to healthcare, a number of concerns were expressed in relation to recent 
policy trends and public spending constraints and, by implication, the extent to which these might be 
threatening rather than realising social rights. For example,“But then you still see that you can buy 
insurances, employers are offering complementary insurance so that you´ll get medical attention faster and 
that may lead to people being less willing to pay taxes and, well the consequences of these changes really 
need to be analysed and I belong to those who believe that we can benefit the most from, from giving 
everybody the same access.” [Swedish civil servant]; “We recognize that 6.5 million people cannot pay the 
healthcare premium of the Healthcare Insurance Act, which is mandatory, and we have – thanks to God – 
created the healthcare allowance…[but) ... if it again becomes a right of people to healthcare, then the 
municipalities will declare they... [cannot] ... pick up that open end financing ...[but will]... say mid-
September to someone: yes you really do have a right to healthcare, but there is no money so come back in 
January… I think that parts of people's right to healthcare is eliminated, and certainly the part of quality of 
healthcare.” [Spanish politician]; “According to article 68 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland 
everyone has the right to health protection. The healthcare system is indeed available to every citizen. A 
separate and extremely complex issue is the availability, efficiency and effectiveness of the healthcare 
system. We have huge problems with that.” [Polish civil servant]. 
Education was similarly perceived as a social right by most respondents, largely because all countries in this 
study have long since legislated for ten to twelve years of compulsory schooling, funded through general 
taxation. This, it was generally assumed, fulfilled the right to education. For example, “We offer everybody 
education, sure the point can be made that the education should be better. But everyone has access to 
education. We have compulsory school attendance, those who don’t show up are followed up on, parents 
get feedback and we’re seeing, at a political level, a general tightening up, for good and bad and we can 
talk all day long about PISA results, about how much the teachers should get to decide things, about 
whether the municipalities or the state centrally should be in charge, but as a social right we’re fulfilling it.”  
[Swedish academic/ former civil servant]. But there were frequent concerns about equity and quality of 
education. Problems with variation in quality, led some respondents to question whether their government 
had completely fulfilled, respected or promoted rights to education. Schools were often perceived as being 
hierarchically stratified which has undermined the idea of quality education for all, irrespective of socio-
economic background. For example,“...well, in Britain I think there is still a broadly comprehensive system, 
but the way in which it is delivered is increasingly fragmented, with competition between parents for places, 
and between schools. But to describe that as a social good when the whole point is to individualize, to get 
people to compete, seems difficult for me to accept it as a social right. And clearly if it is a social right, then 
there should be some sort of egalitarian concept attached to that where people get at least equal; access is 
not loaded access in terms of how poor or where you come from. This does not feel very social to me.” 
[Head of an English policy think tank].  
All respondents acknowledged that a system of social assistance was in place in their respective countries 
and that “Everyone at least has access to something.” [Danish civil servant]. And because countries have 
legislated to guarantee the provision of support when needed, some respondents felt their government 
had fulfilled its obligation. That said, respondents did not necessarily indicate whether they felt that social 
assistance is a social right. Indeed, there was considerable disagreement about the extent to which the 
right to social assistance should be or is sufficiently realised. One of the principal issues revolved around 
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whether the cash benefits in payment were enough for individuals and families to live on. For example, 
“When one looks at the Hartz 4 laws, when one sees how little [cash] that is [per month]—for an individual 
but also for a family—then social assistance is at best respected, but not promoted and not fulfilled.” [Head 
of a German think tank]. The other issue was the shifting nature of social assistance from a right based on 
need, to a right based on recipients demonstrating responsibility in finding work. While some respondents 
approved of this development, others feared it discouraged potentially vulnerable people from exercising 
their right to social assistance or resulted in individuals being placed in low paid and insecure jobs. One 
Dutch politician complained about the impact on disabled people subject to new requirements but for 
whom provision for sheltered employment had been withdrawn: “but the people with disabilities who only 
have jobs through sheltered employment you cannot abolish. We actually have nothing to offer them. One 
may well redefine the welfare state, but you cannot get more people with disabilities to work, so what are 
those social rights - if you have them, but cannot do anything with them - then about ?”. 
Most respondents did not regard housing as a social right, principally because it appeared to them 
impossible to guarantee housing for everyone. Housing was widely perceived as a market commodity that 
should not, or cannot now, be effectively interfered with by the state. For example, “...when we are talking 
about housing we are not really talking about a social right. We are basically talking about a market 
intervention. So I think the discourse around social rights is quite weak in the UK partly because the 
discourse of rights has always been quite weak in the UK and remains so.” [Head of an English think tank]; 
“Today we think of our homes as assets, an economic ... um, yeah it has become a commodity. So if you 
have nothing to bring to the table, no money, no work and maybe you even have some social conditions, 
then nobody is interested in getting you into this market. .... maybe it has happened gradually, but now it 
has become something different than a place to live. I really think so. It signals status, it says so much more 
about you. And we have people who don´t have any of that stuff that´s attractive to – neither to sell nor 
rent to. It´s hard to get established.” [Spanish politician]. Responses varied as to just how effectively state 
intervention might in fact succeed in fulfilling rights to housing. For example, Danish respondents tended to 
report that their government respects, protects and fulfils a right to housing because the Danish 
government financially invests heavily in the provision of demand- and supply-side policies. While housing 
as a right is not enshrined in the constitution it is guaranteed because rent subsidies are available to low-
income individuals and families. Yet in the Netherlands respondents tended to report that a right to 
housing was not fulfilled. While some claimed that the supply of affordable housing units is supposedly 
improving, respondents acknowledged that waiting lists are still too long; there is a mismatch between the 
specification of dwellings available and the requirements of households in need of them; and support for 
homeless households is impeded by the perversity of contradictory housing and welfare regulations. 
 
3) NEEDS, RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
There was ambivalence among respondents as to the relationship between needs, rights and 
responsibilities. It was generally acknowledged that identifiable needs may give rise to state responsibilities 
for the meeting of such need, but subject to variously conceived constraints. These constraints related to 
the financial cost of meeting need; political constraints and limits to political will; and a belief that 
entitlement should be conditional on the demonstration of individual responsibility. Respondents could on 
occasions resort explicitly to the language of contract to address these issues and to this we shall return 
later in the report. But, importantly, even respondents hostile to the concept of social rights could 
acknowledge some form of connection between citizens’ needs and state responsibilities: for example, “So 
again, I am wanting to stop short of using the ‘rights’ term here. But it is clear that individuals do have 
entitlements which the state has a duty to provide them with and there are mechanisms of redress by which 
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they can hold the state to account if they don’t feel it is meeting its duty to provide those entitlements.” 
[English civil servant]. 
 
The first of the constraints mentioned above relates to the cost of meeting need, something that is 
inherent to provision for social rights: “Understanding that that is the right, I understand that it’s an 
obligation of the State to provide adequate resources and means so that the people are entitled to equality 
in their development as such and in their daily lives.” [Spanish civil servant]. But another way of putting this 
is to say “all social rights are a drain upon the treasury.” [Danish academic]. But cost constraint is intimately 
linked to the second constraint and  the question of what is politically possible. Respondents acknowledged 
the especially fragile position of social assistance and housing when governments do not guarantee a right 
because any entitlement or provision of benefits and services can be increased or decreased depending on 
the political climate at any given time. For example, “Rights are conditional, they’re not a free-floating 
thing. ... The fact that all law emerges from policy and politics are political decisions, you cannot simply 
produce these social rights out of thin air independently of material circumstances.” [Danish civil servant]. 
What is more, a discussion about rights cannot take place without acknowledging how the system of rights 
is financed. Some respondents reflected on the way that healthcare, social assistance, housing and 
education are currently financed poses limitations to the fulfilment of rights.  The ability of the state to 
meet the needs of its citizens depends on the political will to legislate and then adequately finance housing, 
education, social assistance and health care. As one Spanish civil servant mused, it is possible with policy 
proposals in “...[in]... say social welfare and education, to reach agreements. It could happen with political 
will. All you need is political will. But in housing you need more than political will. It takes development 
and…of course, there is the question which is key, that of finance…when I say political will, I mean from all 
involved. I mean all the parts of Governments and I’m talking as much the State and the Autonomous 
Communities.”  
The third constraint upon the acceptance of collective responsibility for meeting needs was a moral 
reservation: the idea that rights should be conferred only upon citizens who can demonstrate individual 
responsibility as well as need. Respondents who agreed that social rights are necessary to a well-
functioning society could differ as to where the right balance in the financing and provision of rights might 
lie. Some respondents felt that more responsibility should be placed on the individual, rather than the state 
to cover social risks. They agreed that the state has a responsibility to provide education, health care, social 
assistance and to some degree housing, but they also felt that it was first the responsibility of the individual 
to exhaust all their resources and where a need still exists, then it is the responsibility of the state to meet 
that need. Others explicitly agreed that the provision of, for example, social assistance was necessary but 
equally thought that the right to social assistance should include reciprocal responsibilities. Even in Social 
Democratic Sweden, one politician observed, “Yeah…we [the state] have a responsibility but there’s also 
personal responsibility. So there is not a responsibility were the state doesn’t ask for anything in return. You 
have a personal responsibility to try to take care of your health, you have a responsibility to manage your 
economic life so that you can afford housing, but in those cases where you end up in a situation where you 
have, where you despite trying to act responsibly end up in a situation you can’t handle, we have a shared 
responsibility.” ; and another said “Mnnn…social assistance we have a right, when you have met certain 
requirements. Sometimes they can be pretty tough; you may need to sell your car, you may need to sell your 
flat. But when you really, really need it [social assistance], it’s there for you. And then it’s a right.”.  The 
debate around responsibility centred especially around employment: the idea that one has a responsibility 
to be fully employed because it is through full employment that one can enjoy and realize rights through 
social insurance contributions. And if one is not employed then it is a responsibility to demonstrate that 
one is looking for work. Respondents were by and large aware of the refocussing of labour market 
activation policies upon individual behaviour rather than structural causes and though some approved, 
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others would express concern about this and about the general direction of change. For example, “I think 
we [the Danes] come from a starting point which is really strong, but where certain extreme things that are 
happening at the moment are quietly moving us away from that starting point. I think there are some 
trends, surrounding the idea of being proud to pay taxes and being a welfare state, combined with 
relatively large pressure on public spending after the financial crisis, which leads us to cut down on a lot of 
things, such as unemployment benefits. This is a social right that is being eroded. It is also now being 
discussed whether people should pay to visit the doctor. It is a discussion, which would have been 
completely idiotic to have in the seventies, but is being brought up now.” [Danish politician]. 
 
4) THE BEARERS OR HOLDERS OF SOCIAL RIGHTS 
Finally, respondents were asked which people have rights to social assistance, housing, healthcare and 
education and on what basis. Our purpose was to see how the bearers or holders of social rights are 
constituted in the minds of policy actors. Were they regarded primarily as supplicants, workers, consumers, 
citizens or human beings? In the event, respondents defined the status of the social rights holder largely 
(but not invariably) in technocratic terms; in categorical and administrative rather than conceptual or 
relational terms 
When first asked, respondents tended to allude to the administrative and legislative criteria an individual 
had to meet in order to receive housing, education, healthcare or social assistance. Rights bearers were 
defined by whether or not they had incomes below a certain threshold; whether they were children of 
compulsory school age; whether they were technically homeless; or whether they were in need of basic 
health care, irrespective of whether they have insurance or not. Respondents often then progressed to 
talking about citizenship and residency status, albeit very much in terms of those who had a passport and a 
national identity number and card, and/or lived and worked in the country of their citizenship.  
It was striking that many respondents’ focus was on citizenship as an exclusive rather than an inclusive 
criterion. They seemed to be drawn to debates about migration and who is not or should not be a rights 
holder. For example, “Well, in principle that all has everything to do with citizenship—whether you are a 
German citizen or not. Naturally, what do I know, asylum seekers, their children get to go to school etc. But 
in the first instance it has to do with what nationality one has, in other words, which framework your status 
is, whether one comes from the EU or outside the EU, whether one is an asylum seeker is.” [German 
politician]; “Worth noting is the different situation of Polish citizens and foreigners prescribed in the Polish 
law system as regards fulfilment of the right to social assistance and medical aid. Access to those services is 
provided only to those foreigners who hold a permanent residence card which is issued after 3 years of 
residence in Poland. In this respect Poland obviously violates the binding provisions of the European Social 
Charter.” [Polish civil servant].  
There were two elements to this preoccupation. The first was concerned with the principles of entitlement 
and who had contributed to the social contract by paying taxes and social insurance. The feeling was that 
the freedom of movement (and immigration more broadly) has eroded or undermined the strength of the 
social contract—a contract that is built on one generation contributing for the next generation. For 
example, “Now it is enough that you reside in Denmark as an EU citizen, this entitles you to all sorts of 
rights here. And it is really on this point that things don’t add up any longer, as the system only really works 
if people contribute to it. You receive access to education and training, and then you work throughout your 
working life and finally receive a pension. But if you are only in Denmark during a period in which you aren’t 
working and thereby receive benefits before returning home again, then the system doesn’t work and that 
presents a challenge to our welfare model in any case, that we do not have a permanent population, but 
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one that fluctuates back and forth.” [Danish politician]. The solution advocated by some and feared by 
others was to develop two-tier systems of social provision: one for legitimately settled citizens and another 
less generous safety-net for migrants or foreigners. The second element to the preoccupation with 
migration was an ostensibly more hostile attitude to so called ‘welfare tourism’: a fear that migrants would 
move to a country deliberately to take advantage of its generous welfare state and as a result become an 
unfair burden to the state. For example, “With benefit, I believe you must be a resident, so have a durable 
relationship with the Netherlands. I think we reasonably provide for that. But not for example, that you can 
immediately receive a benefit, based on EU rules. There should be a durable bond with the Netherlands. .... 
to put it really plainly, you have to prevent  the coming into existence of benefit tourism; that people come 
here just because of the fact that they are eligible for that facility. I find it really important that within social 
facilities no private demand is created. You have certain types of people in mind and it is not possible that 
certain new types add in and think: this is my chance.” [Dutch civil servant]. 
Finally, there were respondents who argued that everyone, irrespective of nationality or resident status 
(legal and illegal immigrants) should have a right to health, housing, education and social assistance. This 
was justified in one instance in terms of the economic benefits that can flow from free movement, but in 
another because rights to housing, health, social assistance and education were perceived as human rights, 
that everybody holds: “Because I am a defender of the rights of human beings. So, logically, I am not 
interested in where they are situated. It is true, as I said before, logically the use, access to those rights 
implies having services available in order to have access to these rights. These services, logically, are 
available in specific territories, in more structured societies, in societies that allow, well, how we organize 
ourselves to be able to exercise these rights for all. ... rights must be universal, just by virtue of the fact that 
you are a human being, I understand that you must have all those rights. Because you become part of the 
society in the place where you are, be it temporary or permanently. You are part of that society and 
therefore you should have access to the rights that you have in a structured society...” [Spanish civil 
servant]  
In summary, the interviews revealed inconsistent (and sometimes weak) conceptualisations of social rights; 
marked differences in the commitment or legitimacy attaching to different kinds of social rights (healthcare 
and education being more clearly regarded as rights than social assistance or housing); ambivalence as to 
whether responsibility for meeting need is, or can be, properly mediated by rights; and a certain tendency to 
largely technocratic categorisations of who is, or may be, the bearer of social rights. 
COMPETING DISCOURSES  
What the interviews also revealed was the extent to which respondents were drawing on a mixture of 
competing discourses. Several respondents made explicit references to the idea of a ‘social contract’. But the 
apparent meaning attached to this idea varied between respondents and, on occasions, even within a 
respondent’s own discourse. The various ways in which respondents framed their ideas of social rights, or the 
metaphorical ‘contract’ on which such rights are premised, exhibited some resonance with the welfare regime 
models and corresponding conceptions of citizenship outlined in Figure 1 above. This can be better illustrated 
in Figure 5, which attempts heuristically to characterise the discourses we observed. It is important to 
emphasise that respondents’ discourses were not necessarily consistent with the welfare regimes of the 
countries from which they came and that what we are attempting very tentatively to model is the array of 
discourses to be found among diverse policy actors across Europe as a whole. 
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The taxonomy presented is constructed around two axes. Corresponding to the freedom vs. solidarity axis in 
Figure 1 is an axis that distinguishes between individualistic and solidaristic orientations to the nature of the 
contract between the individual and society. Corresponding to the equality vs. social order axis in Figure 1 is an 
axis that distinguishes between, on the one hand, doctrinal conceptions of rights (as rights inherently vested in 
human beings) and, on the other, claims-based conceptions of rights (as rights that are pragmatically framed 
and/or contextually grounded). The distinctions represented by each axis are dynamic rather than simple 
binary distinctions: the axes are conceptual devices for understanding dialectical processes. Humans negotiate 
life both as individual and as social beings. Rights are realised through an interaction between doctrines and 
claims. The labels we have chosen to characterise the different social rights discourses are intended primarily 
as convenient short-hand identifiers and we are not presuming to assert anything beyond fairly superficial 
philosophical connections. 
doctrinal 
conception 
individualistic 
orientation 
solidaristic 
orientation 
claims-based 
conception 
Figure 5: Competing social rights discourses 
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• A social contract based on a doctrinal conception of rights and an individualistic orientation would 
espouse an essentially utilitarian ethos and a range of constitutional, legal or regulatory principles. We 
would label this neo-Rawlsian. Rawls (1972) is celebrated for imagining how members of a hypothetical 
society - if they were ignorant of the position they would hold in that society - might agree to conjoin 
individual liberty with social justice. Recent followers, such as Stuart White (2003), make a strong 
argument for rights founded in principles of ‘fair reciprocity’. This approach to individual rights and 
responsibilities is capable of accommodating a broad spectrum of liberal approaches to ‘fairness’ - from 
right-wing neoliberalism to centre-ground social liberalism - within which the individual may be framed as 
a citizen, but usually also as an active worker or consumer. By way of illustration, it would accommodate 
the following statement by one of the respondents in our study: “We have made a social contract [and] if 
I have a right it is up to the state to uphold it. … I also have a responsibility, because the right I have is the 
opportunity to participate in the community I’m in”. 
• A social contract based on a doctrinal conception of rights and a solidaristic orientation would espouse an 
essentially universalistic ethos and cosmopolitan/human rights principles. We would label this ‘Global’: 
that is to say it holds that rights are founded in ethical principles and an ideal of shared humanity. 
‘Global’ might here refer literally to internationally defined human rights, or more loosely to shared rights 
of a community or a people.  This approach to collective rights and responsibilities is capable of 
accommodating a spectrum of broadly social democratic (including, perhaps, radical social liberal) or 
democratic socialist thinking, within which the individual may be framed as a citizen, but fundamentally 
as a member of human society. By way of illustration, it would accommodate the following statement by 
one of the respondents in our study: “[Social rights] are based on the concept of human rights and life 
with dignity. … An individual shouldn’t need to rely on his[/her] family or beg for money if (s/)he is in need, 
but society should make funds available.” 
• A social contract based on a claims-based conception of rights and an individualistic orientation would 
espouse an essentially sceptical ethos and subscribe to basic survival principles. We have labelled this 
Hobbesian. Hobbes (1651) infamously denigrated social existence as a war of all against all, necessitating 
a bargain whereby certain freedoms must be constrained in return for the protection of the individual 
against the predations of others. His conception of the  
individual and the role of authority drew inspiration from Luther (see Overhoff, 1997) and was wholly 
consistent with punitive Poor Law traditions. This approach is more concerned with individual 
responsibilities than rights, but accommodates the idea that people should be enabled to survive; that 
there should be a safety net, albeit that it may be subject to conditions or judgements as to the moral 
desert of the supplicant. By way of illustration, it would accommodate the following statement by one of 
the respondents in our study: “A social right ensures ... that you can survive … that you are not dying on 
the street or dying of starvation’. 
• A social contract based on a claims-based conception of rights and a solidaristic orientation would 
espouse a civic-republican ethos and subsidiaristic/social insurance principles. We would label this 
Rousseauian. Rousseau’s (1762) emphasis was on a social contract distilled from, and legitimised through, 
the common will. This approach is concerned with the maintenance of collective commitment and is 
capable of accommodating a spectrum of social Conservative and Christian Democratic thinking. It is 
consistent, for example, which the emphasis in Catholic moral teaching on solidarity and subsidiarity. By 
way of illustration, it would accommodate the following statement by one of the respondents in our 
study:   “Those who pay taxes and social insurance secure the social rights for those who, because of 
falling into difficulty … rely on the solidarity of others. That is how the great risks in life … are financed.” 
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To explore these underlying discourses the interview transcripts from our study were analysed in two further 
sweeps: the first, using the taxonomic categorisations outlined above to identify the dominant and sub-
dominant discourses employed in each transcript; the second to identify from the textual context whether 
participants were expressing (or ‘voicing’) broad support or criticism of their country’s prevailing social rights 
regime. Our respondents had not necessarily been selected on the basis that they were left- or right-wing 
politicians or commentators or that they were government or opposition supporters, so we based our 
classification of critical and supportive forms of discourse on the content of the transcripts, not the status of 
the respondents. The results were applied to generate weighted ‘scores’ for the distribution and context of 
competing discourses within the policy community in each country. The scores were based on the estimated 
shares or proportions (in percentage terms) of each respondent’s interview transcript that could be assigned 
to each of the taxonomic categorisations and the extent (in percentage terms) of each respondent’s interview 
that could be judged to be either critically or supportively voiced; that is to say whether categories of 
discourse used were called upon in support, or by way of criticism, of current provision. The scores for the 
respondents in each country were totalled and are expressed as overall shares (percentages) for each county 
using bar charts in Figures 6b and 6c. An overview, combining the results from all eight countries, is presented 
in Figure 6a. 
The method is of course suboptimal and the findings should be regarded as primarily indicative. This element 
of the study was experimental in methodological terms: it is to be treated as no more than a pilot. With more 
time and resources the robustness of the coding used for the analysis could have been improved, but in any 
event the sample sizes in some instances severely constrain the substantive probative value of the exercise. 
Nevertheless, unless and until such time as it may be possible to refine and replicate such a study on a larger 
scale, the results do warrant discussion. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6a: Distribution of competing discourses - overview 
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The overview presented in Figure 6a, presents our findings in respect of all 55 respondents and may be 
regarded as a snapshot of the pattern of discourses to be found among a disparate community of policy actors 
from across the EU. What the blue bars show is the overall share of that discourse that could be attributed to 
each of the categories of social rights discourses outlined in Figure 5. The red and the green bars respectively 
show the contrasting shares of the supportively and critically voiced discourses attributable to each category. 
The balance between supportively and critically voiced discourses varied between countries, but overall there 
was twice as much supportively voiced framing as critically voiced framing. This, however, is of less relevance 
than the distribution of supportively and critically voiced framing within each category of discourse. 
What the overview suggests is that: 
• Neo-Rawlsian discourse is hegemonic. It is generally dominant, especially in the context of voices 
supportive of prevailing regimes. 
• Rousseauian discourse has a strong presence, whether voiced in a supportive or critical context.  
• Critical voices are especially evident within ‘Global’ discourse. 
• Hobbesian discourse is not that much in evidence. This is despite the many concerns expressed by 
respondents with regard to alleged social rights ‘tourism’, but such concerns may stem less from 
judgementalism towards migrants on the part of the respondents as from their awareness of controversy 
driven by popular opinion. 
 
When it comes to the country by country findings in Figures 6b and 6c, these are less susceptible to useful 
interpretation, though the patterns they disclose are potentially of interest.  
The Swedish interviews suggested the presence of a dominant neoRawlsian discourse; a significant 
Rousseauian discourse and a subsidiary ‘Global’ discourse, with critical voices distributed between the 
discourses, but especially evident within ‘Global’ discourse. The Danish interviews suggested the presence of a 
combination of neoRawlsian and Rousseauian discourses and a slightly less dominant ‘Global’ discourse, with 
broad support for the prevailing rights regime (but a single Rousseauian critic). Swedish and Danish 
respondents seemed on the whole only a bit more solidaristic than other respondents, with the Swedish 
respondents now more liberal than the Danes. The impression superficially conveyed was of two formerly 
Social Democratic countries under the sway of neoliberal influences albeit with countervailing solidaristic 
traditions. 
The Dutch interviews suggested the presence of a combination of Rawlsian and Rousseauian discourses, an 
underlying Hobbesian discourse and the absence of ‘Global’ discourse, with a critical voice especially evident 
within Rousseauian discourse (suggesting, perhaps, some nostalgia for a corporatist past). The impression 
superficially conveyed was of a formerly corporatist/social democratic hybrid regime now contending with 
neoliberal and neoconservative influences. In contrast, the German interviews suggested the presence of a 
strong ‘Global’ discourse (indicative, perhaps, of the influence of human rights principles within the post WWII 
German constitution and/or the strength of a nascent Social Democratic influence), but with a mixture of 
underlying Rawlsian and Rousseauian discourses. In the German case, critical voices outnumbered supportive 
voices though both were evenly distributed across the discourses. The impression superficially conveyed was 
of an essentially corporatist/conservative regime experiencing tensions (and debate) between conflicting 
social-democratic traditions and neoliberal influences. 
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Figure 6b: Distribution of competing discourses -Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands and Germany 
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Figure 6c: Distribution of competing discourses - UK, Spain, Poland and Estonia 
 
37 
 
 The UK interviews suggested the presence of a dominant neoRawlsian discourse with subsidiary ‘Global’ and 
Rousseauian discourses, and critical voices present within all, but especially the ‘Global’ and Rousseauian, 
discourses. The impression superficially conveyed was of a country subject to neoliberal economic 
orthodoxies, but with underlying solidaristic influences, reflecting in part the voices of left-wing intellectuals 
among the respondents but also the legacy of the country’s past adherence to social insurance principles. 
The Spanish interviews suggested the presence of a dominant ‘Global’ discourse, a significant Rousseauian 
discourse and a subsidiary neoRawlsian discourse. In the Spanish case, critical voices outnumbered supportive 
voices though both were distributed across the discourses, albeit that critical voices were especially evident 
within ‘Global’ discourse. The impression superficially created was of a Mediterranean regime in which 
conflicting social democratic and social conservative traditions are resisting neoliberal austerity economics.  
The Polish interviews suggested the presence of a dominant neoRawlsian discourse, a surviving Rousseauian 
discourse; and elements of a Hobbesian discourse. The ‘Global’ discourse appeared to be absent and critical 
voices were evident only within the neoRawlsian discourse. The Estonian interviews suggested the presence of 
a dominant neoRawlsian discourse, with an echo of a ‘Global’ discourse. The Rousseauian discourse was 
absent, but it must be remembered that there were only three Estonian respondents, which particularly 
constrains our ability to comment. As in Poland, the only critical voice - a voice calling for faster progress - was 
evident within the neoRawlsian discourse. The impression superficially conveyed was of two post-communist 
countries, subject to neo-liberal influences, of which one (Poland) may have been clinging conservatively to 
past traditions. 
From this interview-based study of contemporary discursive constructions of social rights, it may clearly be 
seen that there is no unanimity across Europe as to the understanding of social rights. What is more, variation 
of discourse and understanding within countries would appear to be as significant as variations between 
countries. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS: THE PROSPECTS FOR EUROPEAN SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP 
It has been contended that the ‘social dimension’ of the EU is ‘near collapse’ and that we should take a ‘sober 
view’ of the potential of European Social Citizenship (Barbier, 2013: 105 and 108). The idea of European 
Citizenship has been primarily relevant only for those citizens who wish and are able to move between 
member states, while its influence upon the rights of settled citizens has been largely secondary. Our focus is 
on social rights of citizenship and most certainly, social rights are and will continue primarily to be legislated 
for and administered at national level. But if there is to be a European dimension to social citizenship it would 
have to be relevant not only to intra-Union migrants, but also to that vast majority of EU citizens who do not 
move about, but ‘stay at home’ (van Parijs, 2013). 
THE ISSUES 
Our evidence, based on historical case studies and contemporary key-informant interviews, points to two 
issues: 
1. There are disjunctures between social rights discourse and social policy discourse. The two are not 
necessarily coterminous. Social policy may be framed without regard to the consideration of social rights, 
and yet social rights may be realised nevertheless. Conceptions of social rights as rights of citizenship, if 
they exist in the minds of policy actors, may vary, may be contradictory, or may be confused. Certainly 
the association between social rights and any idea of cosmopolitan, supra- or post-national citizenship is 
at best tenuous. The barriers to the defence and promotion of social citizenship in Europe lay not so 
much with prevailing inconsistencies in the de facto realisation of social rights, as with conceptual 
uncertainty and ideological diversity.  
2. Clearly, it is not possible to legislate for ideological consensus, but inferences that may be drawn from the 
patterns disclosed by our evidence are consistent with suggestions that the hegemonic conception of 
citizenship across Europe is increasingly liberal/individualistic, rather than solidaristic, albeit that, in 
different shapes and forms, solidaristic convictions are shown to have survived in all but one of the 
European countries we have studied.  A commitment to social rights and the welfare state became 
sustainable by virtue of a consensus stimulated by a social liberal impetus; at various times and in various 
ways by the liberalism of Thomas Paine, the Krausist movement, ordoliberalism3, F.D. Roosevelt, 
Hobhouse, Beveridge, etc., etc.; a liberalism that was, arguably, more tolerant of ideological pluralism 
than the prevailing economistic neoliberal orthodoxy; a liberalism to which social conservatives and social 
democrats could accommodate. In so far as the EU continues to appeal to solidarity, its appeals of late 
have been to solidarity between nations in the face of economic crisis, not solidarity between citizens. 
 
There are competing ideological justifications for social rights and rather than assume that the resulting 
diversity of conceptual interpretation may be elided through the sharing and promotion of administrative ‘best 
practice’ (as envisaged by the Open Method of Co-ordination, see e.g. Heidenreich & Zeitlin, 2009) the 
potential dynamism of that diversity could, perhaps, be recognised and embraced. This is something that 
requires debate beyond academia. 
A POSTSCRIPT 
3 A term first coined in the 1930s by the Frieburg School of economic thought, but more recently and more 
widely referred to as ‘Social Market liberalism’.  
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A recommendation already made in one of the reports associated with the Social Rights Work Package (WP6) 
of the bEUcitizen project (Bruzelius et al., 2015: 31) is that of an EU-wide minimum benefit for mobile 
jobseekers, but it is additionally suggested that ‘this could be subsequently expanded to all EU citizens in the 
form of an EU-wide Basic Income Guarantee, which might constitute a cornerstone of future EU citizenship’. 
The suggestion that Member States might be encouraged to co-operate in exploring the possibility of a 
Universal Basic Income (UBI) as a tool to improve their respective social security systems has already been the 
subject of a European Citizens’ Initiative. (NOTE: It should be noted that a Basic Income Guarantee is not 
necessarily the same as non-withdrawable UBI.) Specifically, however, the objective of the Initiative in 2013 
was  
to offer to each person in the EU the unconditional rights as an individual, to having his/her material 
needs met to ensure a life of dignity as stated by the EU treaties, and to empower participation in 
society supported by the introduction of the UBI. In the short term, initiatives such as “pilot studies” 
(Art 156 TFEU) and examination of different models of UBI (EP resolution 2010/2039(INI) should be 
promoted by the EU. 
The initiative attracted some 285,000 signatures or ‘statements of support’ from EU citizens, though this failed 
by a considerable margin to pass the overall 1 million signature threshold required to secure its formal 
consideration. The numbers of signatures obtained in the eight countries participating in the study reported 
above are set out in Figure 7, which shows that in two of the eight countries (Estonia and the Netherlands) 
support exceeded the ECI’s national threshold, though support in other countries was lower (especially in the 
UK and Poland). These results have everything to do with the relative effectiveness or failure of campaigns by 
activists in the countries concerned, yet they demonstrate that the idea of a basic income, even with minimal 
publicity, is capable of attracting some level of popular support. 
 
 
 
* The threshold set under ECI rules that must be exceeded by at least 7 countries 
Source: http://basicincome2013.eu/en/statistics.htm 
 
Figure 7: Support for European Citizens’ Initiative for an Unconditional Basic Income (2013) 
 
 
More importantly, the concept of a basic income, or a Citizen’s Income, is well established and has been 
debated for many years (see especially van Parijs, 1992, 2014; Torry, 2013, 2015;). Versions of such a proposal 
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can be traced back to Thomas Paine (1791). By itself, the right to a Citizen’s Income is not a universal ‘silver 
bullet’ solution to all social problems (though pilot studies suggest it can, in some circumstances, be 
remarkably effective), but as a policy proposal it provides a catalyst and a focus for the open negotiation of the 
basis of our social citizenship. It has been demonstrated that the idea of of social insurance found support, 
albeit for different reasons, from across the ideological spectrum. The idea of a Citizen’s Income might find 
support in a similar way.4 Depending on the design of a basic income or Citizen’s Income scheme, it can foster 
individual independence and collective solidarity. A European Citizen’s Income, payable to every EU citizen, 
would create a substantive social right attaching directly to EU citizenship. It would make a reality of European 
social citizenship. 
The European Citizens’ Initiative may on this occasion have failed, and it may well be that in the present 
climate an attempt to foster a more extensive exploration and debate would founder over the details by which 
a Citizen’s Income could be jointly funded and delivered. Such a project may, however, stand a greater chance 
of succeeding than the idea of a pan-European social insurance scheme, such as that proposed by Pieters, 
(1989; and see Pieters & Vansteenkiste, 1993).  The advantage of a European Citizen’s Income is that it would 
be received by every citizen. At whatever level it is set, a European Citizen’s Income could play a key role in 
cementing a shared European identity; it could facilitate freedom of movement; it could provide a common 
underpinning to national social security systems for all Europeans. It may be that a European Citizen’s Income 
could be incrementally developed, starting at a modest, primarily symbolic, level. When a very modest 
universal carer’s allowance was first introduced in the UK, there is evidence that recipients valued it not for its 
monetary value, but as a symbol of recognition of their contribution as carers and their status as citizens 
(McLaughlin, 1991). 
Even if such a debate were to prove inconclusive at this time, it could serve to raise awareness of social rights 
and social citizenship as dynamic concepts, capable of understanding, negotiation and agreement from a 
variety of perspectives, and which may yet be realisable for the citizens of Europe as a whole. 
 
4 See, for example, Torry, M. (forthcoming, 2016) The Feasibility of Citizen’s Income, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan (Chapter 8) for a detailed account of how Citizen’s Income can be accommodated variously to 
contemporary social liberal (in the context of this report, a broadly neo-Rawlsian discursive framing), 
social democratic (broadly ‘Global’), neo-conservative (broadly Hobbesian); and/or social conservative 
(broadly Rousseauian) ideologies. 
41 
 
                                                                
 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Adamo, S. (2015). The History and current development of social rights in Denmark. Report prepared for Task 
6.3 of the bEUcitizen (Barriers Towards EU Citizenship) integrated project.  
Bailey, D. (2008). Explaining the underdevelopment of 'Social Europe': A critical realisation. Journal of 
European Social Policy, 18(3), 232-245.  
Barbier, J.-C. (2013). To what extent can the European Union deliver 'social citizenship' to its citizens? In A. 
Evers & A. Guillemard (Eds.), Social Policy and Citizenship: The changing landscape. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Beveridge, W. (1942). Social Insurance and Allied Services (Cmd. 6404 ed.). London: HMSO. 
Blank, F. (2015). The History and current development of social rights in Germany. Report prepared for Task 
6.3 of the bEUcitizen (Barriers Towards EU Citizenship) integrated project.  
Bonoli, G. (1997) Classifying welfare states. Journal of European Social Policy, 26(2), 352-72. 
Bruzelius, C., Chase, E. and Seelieb-Kaiser, M.  (2015) Social Rights of EU Migrants: A comparative perpective, 
Deliverable 6.1, Utrecht: bEUcitizen Project 
Cerami, A., & Vanhuysse. (2009). Post-Communist Welfare Pathways: Theorizing social policy transformations 
in Central and Eastern Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Commission for the European Communities. (1993). European Social Policy: Options for the UNion. 
Luxembourg: OOPEC. 
Davy, U. (2013). Social citizenship going international: Changes in the reading of UN-sponsored economic and 
social rights. International Journal of Social Welfare, 22(Supplement 1), S15-S31.  
de Schweinitz, K. (1961). England's Road to Social Security. Perpetua: University of Pennsylvania. 
Dean, H. (1991). Social Security and Social Control. London: Routledge. 
Dean, H. (2010). Understanding Human Need. Bristol: The Policy Press. 
Dean, H. (2012). Social Policy (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Polity. 
Dean, H. (2015). Social Rights and Human Welfare. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Delors, J. (1986). L'Espace Social Européén. 2 EC, 12.  
Donnelly, J. (2003). Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (2nd ed.). Ithaca: NY: Cornell University 
Press. 
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity. 
Esping-Andersen, G. (1996). Welfare States in Transition. London: Sage. 
Falkner, G. (2000). The treaty on European Union and its revision: Sea change or empty shell for European 
social policies? In S. Kuhnle (Ed.), Survival of the European Welfare State. London: Routledge. 
Ferragina, E., & Seeleib-Kaiser, M. (2011). Thematic Review: Welfare regime debate - past, present, futures? 
Policy and Politics, 39(4), 583-611.  
42 
 
 
 
 
 
Ferrera, M. (2006). The ‘Southern Model’ of Welfare in Social Europe.  Journal of European Social Policy, 6(1), 
17-37 
Foucault, M. (1965). Madness and Civilisation: A history of insanity in the Age of Reason (R. Howard, Trans.). 
London: Tavistock. 
Fraser, D. (2003). The Evolution of the British Welfare State (3rd ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan. 
Freeman, M. (2002). Human Rights. Cambridge: Polity. 
George, V., & Manning, N. (1980). Socialism, Social Welfare and the Soiet Union. London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul. 
George, V., & Wilding, P. (1985). Ideology and Social Welfare. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Glennerster, H., & Hills, J. (Eds.). (1998). The State of Welfar (second edition ed.). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
González Begega, S. (2014). The History and current development of social rights in Spain. Report prepared for 
Task 6.3 of the bEUcitizen (Barriers Towards EU Citizenship) integrated project.  
Goodin, R., Headey, B., Muffels, R., & Dirven, H. (1999). The Real Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hantrais, L. (2007). Social Policy in the European Union (3rd ed.). Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Heeger, S., & Pennings, F. (2014). The History and current development of social rights in The Netherlands. 
Report prepared for Task 6.3 of the bEUcitizen (Barriers Towards EU Citizenship) integrated project.  
Heidenreich, M., & Zeitlin, J. (Eds.). (2009). Changing European Emplyment and Welfare Regimes: The influence 
of the open method of co-ordination on national reforms. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Hermann, C. (2007). Neoliberalism in the EU. Studies in Political Economy, 79, 61-89.  
Hills, J., Sefton, T., & Stewart, K. (Eds.). (2009). Towards a More Equal Society? Poverty, inequality and policy 
since 1997. Bristol: The Policy Press. 
Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviathan (eds R. Tuck, R. Guess, Q Skinner -1991 revised student ed.). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Honneth, A. (1995). The Struggle for Recognition: The moral grammar of social conflicts. Cambridge: Polity. 
Isin, E., Brodie, J., Juteau, D., & Stasiulis, D. (2008). Recasting the Social in Citizenship. In E. Isin (Ed.), Recasting 
the Social in Citizenship. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Janoski, T. (1998). Citizenship and Civil Society: A framework of rights and obligations in Liberal, traditional and 
Social Democratic regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Jessop, B. (2002). The Future of the Capitalist State. Cambridge: Polity. 
Kananen, J. (2014). The Nordic Welfare State in Three Eras: From emancipation to discipline. Farnham: Ashgate. 
Kaufmann, F. (1988). Christentum und Wohlfahrtsstaat. Zeitschrift für Socialreform, 34(2), 65-88.  
Lai, T., Habicht, T., Kahur, K., Reinap, M., Kiivet, R., & van Ginneken, E. (2013). Estonia: Health system review. 
Health Systems in Transition, 15(6), 1-196.  
Leibfried, S. (2005). Social policy - left to judges and the markets? In H. Wallace, W. Wallace & M. Pollack 
(Eds.), Policy-making in the European Union (6th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
43 
 
 
 
 
 
Lister, R. (2003). Citizenship: Feminist perspectives, second edition. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Marshall, T. H. (1950). Citizenship and social class. In T. Marshall & T. Bottomore (Eds.), Citizenship and Social 
Class (1992 ed.). London: Pluto. 
Marshall, T. H. (1981). The Right to Welfare and Other Essays. London: Heinemann. 
McLaughlin, E. (1991). Social Security and Community Care: The case of the Invalid Care Allowance (DSS 
Reseach Report No. 4). London: HMSO. 
Mishra, R. (1984). The Welfare State in Crisis. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Overhoff, J. (1997). The Lutheranism of Thomas Hobbes. Political Thought, 18(4), 604-624.  
Paine, T. (1791). The Rights of Man (1984 edition ed.). Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Pfau-Effinger, B. (2005). Culture and the welfare state: Reflections on a complex interrelation. Journal of Social 
Policy, 34(1), 3-20. 
Newman, J. (Ed.) (2005) Remaking Governance: Peoples,politics and the puiblic sphere. Bristol: The Policy 
Press. 
Pieters, D. (1989). Sociale Zekerheid no 1992: Een over Twaalf. Tilburg: Tilburg University. 
Pieters, D., & Vansteenkiste, S. (1993). The Thirteenth State: Towards a European Community Social Insurance 
Scheme for Intra-Community Migrants. Leuven: EISS. 
Powell, M., & Hewitt, M. (2002). Welfare State and Welfare Change. Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Rawls, J. (1972). A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Roosevelt, F. D. (1941). State of the Union address to Congress 6 January: 
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=70&page=transcript. 
Rousseau, J.-J. (1762). Of the social contract or principles of political right. In V. Gourevitch (Ed.), Rousseau: The 
Social Contract and other later Political Writings (1997 ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sahlins, M. (1974). Stone Age Economics. London: Tavistock. 
Scharpf, F. (2002). The European Social Model: Coping with the challenges of diversity. Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 40(4), 645-670.  
Shue, H. (1980). Basic Rights: Subsistence, affluence and US foreign policy. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Swedrup, O. (2015). The History and current development of social rights in Sweden. Report prepared for Task 
6.3 of the bEUcitizen (Barriers Towards EU Citizenship) integrated project.  
Świątkowski, A., & Wujczyk, M. (2014). The history and current development of social rights in Poland. Report 
prepared for Task 6.3 of the bEUcitizen (Barriers Towards EU Citizenship) integrated project.  
Tavits, G. (2014). The history and current development of social rights in Estonia. Report prepared for Task 6.3 
of the bEUcitizen (Barriers Towards EU Citizenship) integrated project.  
Titmuss, R. (1970). The Gift Relationship. London: Allen and Unwin. 
Torry, M. (2013). Money for Everyone: Why we need a Citizen's Income. Bristol: The Policy Press. 
Torry, M. (2015). 101 Reasons for a Citizen's Income. Bristol: The Policy Press. 
44 
 
 
 
 
 
Turner, B. (1986). Citizenship and Capitalism: The debate over reformism. London: Allen and Unwin. 
van Parijs, P. (2013) Reflections on EU Citizenship. A contribution to the Open Forum Discussion at the 
bEUcitizen ‘Kick Off’ Conference, Utrecht, 18 September. 
van Parijs, P. (2014) An unconditional basic income in Europe will help end the crisis. An interview given 11 
April following a conference on the “Unconditional Basic Income” organised in the European 
Economic and Social Committee and reported at www.euractiv.com/sections/social-europe-jobs/van-
parijs-unconditional-basic-income-europe-will-help-end-crisis-301503 [accessed 4/9/15] 
van Parijs, P. (Ed.). (1992). Arguing for Basic Income. London: Verso. 
Vielle, P. (2010). How the Horizontal Social Clause cqan be made to work: The lessons of gender 
mainstreaming. ETUI Policy Brief - European Social Policy, 2010(6). 
White, S. (2003). The Civic Minimum. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
  
ANNEX I THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
Notes to interviewer: 
• Please thank the interviewee for agreeing to take part and confirm the information and undertakings 
provided on the Consent Form.  
• The schedule is short, but the questions are open and potentially complex. Interviewers are encouraged, 
where appropriate, to prompt the interviewees to expand where possible on their answers, but to allow 
them to pass on questions which are clearly beyond their area of expertise. 
 
Questions: 
1) The term 'social rights' (in its general sense) is contested and possibly (for some people) controversial. What 
do you understand by the term? Is the underlying concept familiar/ meaningful to you? Are you in favour of 
social rights and why (or why not)? 
2) To what extent - if at all - would you say that [your country] respects, promotes and/or fulfils rights in 
relation to each of the following:  
 (a) social assistance;  
 (b) housing;  
 (c) health care;  
 (d) education?  
If so, why does [your country] do this: what is the justification? 
3) Insofar as of [your country's] people may need - 
 (a) social assistance;  
 (b) housing;  
 (c) health care;  
 (d) education;  
does that give them rights? Does it give the state responsibilities? 
4) Taking each of these in turn,  
 (a) social assistance;  
 (b) housing;  
 (c) health care;  
 (d) education;  
which of [your country's] people have rights and on what basis? Would you say that they have rights because 
they are citizens or residents; because they are the users or customers of public services; because they are 
workers or the dependants of workers; because they are especially vulnerable (e.g. especially poor or sick or 
old); is it a combination of these criteria? 
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